Rejecting and restructuring a complex governance model helps member organizations realign to pursue their divergent strategies and face new market realities in Philadelphia.
Stephen Klasko, MD, only took the job as president and CEO with Philadelphia's Thomas Jefferson University and Hospitals under the promise from its board that he had their support in remaking its complex corporate structure. In doing so, Jefferson Health System essentially demolished the financial and operating allegiances that tied the system together.
Some would see that as going against the grain in a healthcare services business environment in which bigger is often seen as better—size as a hedge for leverage in healthcare contracting—a familiar strategy that smacks of a fee-for-service mentality, says Klasko.
But the move makes more sense than is immediately obvious, says the former CEO of both USF Health in Tampa and dean at the University of South Florida's Morsani College of Medicine.
In fact, the board already had the move in mind when it hired Klasko in June 2013 as president of Thomas Jefferson University and CEO of both Thomas Jefferson University Hospital and Jefferson University Physicians. Just in those titles alone, he saw a need for consolidation.
"We had [consolidated] the old fashioned way, and a good part of why I was chosen out of 50 people who were interested in this job from more traditional academic background, is that the board recognized we needed to be a very different entity going forward," he says.
The old structure had the person in Klasko's job reporting to the Thomas Jefferson University board, the board of TJUH System (which doesn't provide patient care services) and Jefferson Health System, which in essence was the holding company for Thomas Jefferson Hospitals and the four Main Line Health hospitals.
"The first person I talked to was Jack (Lynch, president and CEO, Main Line Health)," says Klasko. We both recognized that we have two great organizations that are very different and have different goals and aspirations, yet were part of a system that made a lot of sense when it was built but may not make sense in the same way now given where healthcare is going."
John J. Lynch III
President and CEO
Main Line Health
The old structure was an anachronism for many reasons, both leaders agree.
An Amicable Divorce
So did that mean the two provider systems joined together through an entity, Jefferson Health System, should tie themselves closer together, keep things the same, or cut themselves apart?
At one time, the system encompassed Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Main Line Health's four hospitals, Magee Rehabilitation Hospital and what is now Aria Health—at that time a three-hospital system anchored by Frankford Hospital, and what is now Einstein Healthcare Network, anchored by Einstein Medical Center.
Over time, both Einstein and Aria left the Jefferson Health System, leaving Main Line, TJUH and Magee.
Together, Klasko and Lynch quickly came to the determination that the two organizations were vastly different, with different goals and aspirations, and would likely do much better apart. The divorce was amicable, say both leaders, and started before Klasko was hired, as Lynch was on the search committee when the combined organization went looking for a new CEO.
"In his interview process, Steve made it clear that he believed urban academic medical centers could not rely just on clinical revenue to support the research and teaching mission. There were other income streams needed. That was music to my ears because [Main Line] doesn't have enough clinical income to support that."
Klasko says the reorganization clearly needed to happen because the two organizations were so different, the cultures would have never successfully blended in an environment where the organizations' goals were, and should be, so dramatically different.
"Bottom line: while we're both delivering healthcare, Main Line has minor involvement in research and education, while Steve's mission is very different," Lynch adds.
"We both have significant capital needs and different geographic regions we pull our patients from, so some investments make sense for one and not the other. Yet we were latched together in terms of debt."
Governance
Klasko says the kindred spirits agreed that while the current in healthcare is dominated by those who feel driven headlong toward mergers and developing necessary scale of services, what's least talked about and considered is culture and what different entities' relationships should be going forward.
"What it really gets down to is governance," says Klasko. "For all the right reasons, our board consisted of Main Line people and Jefferson people. There weren't really any independent directors. So that made it strategically unaligned. They acted as they should, representing their interests within the holding company, and that worked for a long time. But there was no way, unless you did a full merger, that you were going to be able to push through that board to satisfy what we needed as an academic urban medical center."
For instance, says Klasko, for Jefferson University and Hospitals, the entity he now leads, the main competitive threat consists of the academic medical centers near the close border with New Jersey.
"That's the least of Jack's worries," Klasko says. "So how do I go to that combined board and ask them to invest $100 million in New Jersey?"
Through that lens, the dissolution of the combined holding company was the only right decision.
The first and perhaps most important change is that the two entities are no longer tied together in joint capital decisions.
"We took back our bonding and Main Line took back theirs," says Klasko.
That simple step allowed Thomas Jefferson University and Hospitals to look at strategies that might not have been of interest to Main Line and vice versa, and now both boards can make decisions unconstrained by other, complicating governance.
The second casualty of the dissolution of the holding company was in joint managed care contracting.
"That wasn't much of a loss because first-dollar coverage we're still doing together through the ACO," says Klasko [more on that later]. "Insurers are smart enough to know if you don't have a population health framework, they'll still look at you and negotiate with you as two separate entities if you're not fully merged."
"It does mean Main Line now has to negotiate separately with not quite as large a market share and the same with us. But in different ways, we're so important to the area, we'll be fine even in those contracts," Klasko says.
Rumors
During the process of dissolution of the holding company, what kept rumors in check was constant communication between the two leaders and constant updates to their boards, both leaders say.
"Jack and I meet every two weeks about rumors," says Klasko. "Everyone's looking for the bad part of this, the soap opera. But even when we were JHS we were in a coopetition model. The same is true now. But Jack knows he won't wake up and read in the paper about something with a negative impact to his system that the full board has decided. And that didn't always exist."
For his part, Klasko envisions Thomas Jefferson University and Hospitals as the entrepreneurial academic center in Philadelphia. It's a crowded market— there are four other academic medical centers in Philadelphia. That's one reason TJUH merged with the university following the dissolution of TJUH System.
"We needed to be nimble, creative, and not have a physician group being part of one entity and not another," Klasko explains. "In fact, I would argue that I did consolidate. This allowed me to consolidate with the university. The question is when we do other strategic alignments, who would they be with and what would they look like?"
Going from three boards to one, he argues, makes it much easier to make such decisions.
"Any consolidation we would do would be something that adds to our academic, geographic, or physician alignment," he says. "I don't think scale for scale's sake is necessarily the answer. And a lot of people make mistakes based on scale with mergers."
The ACO
Though they're not tied together directly in a financial sense any longer, that doesn't mean there aren't plenty of areas for collaboration between Thomas Jefferson University and Hospitals and Main Line, not the least of which is Delaware Valley ACO, the accountable care organization owned by Jefferson, Main Line, Holy Redeemer and Magee, which has 35,000 lives and an expanding group of about 300 physicians.
Klasko and Lynch are co-board chairs. "Now we spend more time together than before," Lynch jokes. "Another thing is that we redrafted an academic affiliation between the two organizations that is stronger than we had before. We maintained or strengthened our clinical collaborations. Through this restructuring, for the things that matter to patients and doctors, we still have an open-book opportunity to do things together."
"How we've done this represents our best relationship and what will be a model for how we can be stronger today than we were before," says Klasko. "We're literally not constrained around anything artificial anymore."
Besides being willing to be interviewed together, Klasko and Lynch still find plenty of opportunities to get together and work in other ways, despite the "amicable divorce." For Lynch, one recent meeting is forever seared in his very synapses.
"How many people are able to get their partner to dump ice over their head for charity?"
Detroit's Henry Ford Health System has named a new CEO, but he won't inherit that title for more than two years. Here's why this unusual succession plan has merit, and might not be the last such move we'll see.
News about an unusual changing of the guard in hospital leadership went down this week, when Nancy Schlichting and Henry Ford Health System, the $4.5 billion (revenue) Detroit behemoth, chose a successor after more than 10 years with Schlichting at the helm.
Wright Lassiter III
She guided the system through a raft of disruptive change in an economically struggling region, after working as a hospital CEO within the system for more than four years. She wants to give her successor a similar running start.
Wright Lassiter III, 51, currently president and CEO of Alameda Health System in Oakland, will take the reins Dec. 15 as president of the health system before assuming the CEO title in 2016.
Through Schlichting's tenure, Henry Ford Health System has won a Baldrige Award, spent $300 million creating a brand-new holistic health concept in West Bloomfield, MI, and managed to remain profitable for 10 years and counting.
Her tenure has been marked by these momentous achievements, but also, more quietly, by assembling and developing the talent that makes her look good (her words, not mine), and which allows the organization to remain successful in uncertain times. In some ways, choosing Lassiter was a continuation of her policy on replacing talented leaders.
After seeing Lassiter speak at a panel on a conference on the future of healthcare last year, Schlichting demonstrated her belief that as CEO, she should always be seeking talent. And that's what she saw from Lassiter, whom she did not previously know.
"I thought, who is that man?" she says. "I had not met too many people like this. He had some of the most creative ideas on managing a vulnerable population that I had ever heard. I'm always seeking to bring talent into Henry Ford, so I immediately looked him up to learn more about his background. Then I picked up the phone and called him cold."
Ready for a Change As it turned out, the longest-tenured CEO in Alameda Health System history was interested, although at the time, no one other than the board knew that Schlichting was thinking about retirement. At 59, she is still young for a CEO.
Nancy Schlichting
"I've been leading healthcare organizations as either the COO or CEO level for 32 years. I started at 30 at 600-bed hospital in Akron, Ohio. And that's a long time," she says. "It's about being able to do some new and different things in my life."
The irony is that Lassiter had decided not to go to that conference, and only a last-minute plea from his PR staff to his executive assistant got that conference back on his calendar. Eventually, he gave in and made the trip.
"Ultimately, this woman [who may want to remain nameless] convinced me to do it," he says, admitting that he knew of Schlichting but had never met her. "Otherwise, our paths may not have crossed."
Unusual Search It's lucky they did, said Schlichting, about her unusual CEO search, which didn't employ a search firm or any of the other trappings of modern executive talent searches. She says Lassiter's experience being successful at managing costs, care, and population health improvements in a Medicaid-dominated patient mix will be one of his key assets as he takes control of Henry Ford Health System.
In most such transitions, Dec. 15 would close the door on Schlichting's leadership, but Schlichting and Henry Ford aren't following that script either. Instead of making immediate way for her successor, Schlichting will stay on through 2016 as CEO to help guide the new leader through the complexities of Henry Ford's variety of service offerings.
"Henry Ford is an unusual model. We need to double down on things we do well, really pushing the concepts on managing population health, in using our health plan and medical group, and all our services to understand where the consumer is today," she says.
"Now there are so many people shopping in a retail fashion and we have to be sensitive in how they want to receive information and connect with them in different ways. That requires us to be very creative how to deliver and finance health delivery. Henry Ford has a unique opportunity in population health and we need to make sure we execute well."
The last time I spoke with Schlichting prior to this week, we happened to be chatting about her philosophy on leadership development and her leadership style, which is why my recent conversation with both Lassiter and Schlichting resonated—it's the ultimate expression of her leadership style to stay on through a "training" transition to Lassiter.
"One of the commitments I made to the board is that we would have a smooth transition in leadership and I told them I would stay as long as I could to make sure that happened," she says. "This is exactly what I'd hoped for."
'Common Values' As noted in that previous story, much of Schlichting's leadership style is rooted in seeking out common values and providing constant feedback on how well her team is meeting its self-imposed targets—financial or clinical. She boils it all down to transparency of information, culture development, and engagement of people.
"It's critical to attract talented leaders with common values," she told me then, answering a question about teamwork in general and team-based care specifically. "I can set a tone at the top, but if you don't have the team who is able to execute on that—managing change and taking risk in an effective way—you won't make it work."
She wants to give Lassiter the same chance to learn how the organization works on the job prior to taking over the top post. This is similar to how she trained as leader of Henry Ford Medical Center for 4.5 years before she was named CEO of the system in 2004.
He'll get the added benefit of his predecessor showing him the ropes. She thinks that's necessary because of the complexity of Henry Ford, which she also sees as an attribute in the drive toward managing the health of populations.
"We have a very large, complex organization in a challenging market," she says. "Our model also has so many dimensions with a health plan, large group practice, huge ambulatory network, the full continuum of care, academic medical center, we've got it all. I know he'll appreciate getting to know the organization, knowing where all the challenges might be and how to take risk and the culture of the organization. He'll pick up on it quickly."
Shocked Staff For his part, Lassiter says he's dealing with a lot of shock from staff and physicians at Alameda, simply because he wasn't looking for a job, and no one outside a select few knew that Henry Ford was looking for a new leader either.
"This has happened quickly and quietly," he says. "My organization knew when I took this job nine years ago that I would not finish my career here. Some said they were shocked but not surprised."
That said, neither Lassiter nor his wife has any personal connection to Detroit or Michigan. However, one drawing point is that his daughter is a freshman basketball player at Northeastern University in Boston. The travel distance to see her play just got cut by two-thirds, he says, which is certainly a plus.
But what really sold him on the change is that he wanted to work with Schlichting and a health system that seems to have all the pieces to manage the health of populations already, while Alameda is still a work in progress in that regard.
"Really, the only thing that could have caused this kind of change is the organization and its current leadership," he says.
He notes that much of what he's been patterning Alameda's strategy on has been similar to what the much larger Henry Ford Health System has already achieved.
Market Similarities "What's different is you start with scale. Henry Ford is already a fully integrated delivery system offering everything that it appears you need to manage population health. At Alameda, we're aspiring to get there, but we certainly don't offer everything that comprehensive health and wellness system would need to manage population health."
While every market is different, Oakland and Detroit are very similar in that they're highly competitive. But historically Alameda has focused on safety net care, and the community didn't think of that system as being able to provide care for all except for trauma services.
Conversely, he says, Henry Ford is "already well-placed in this market. I've been running what some would call the underdog system, fighting for a seat at the same table as traditional organizations. Henry Ford doesn't have to fight for a seat, but does have to evolve around healthcare reform."
Lassiter has experience in the kind of market he's entering in Detroit, with large Medicaid patient populations. He'll move into a much larger system, with more than 18,000 employees versus 4,500 in Oakland, but he has a good track record of financial success in a difficult market.
Alameda has achieved eight straight years of positive operating margins. In other areas, such as physician integration, for example, Alameda is aspiring to where Henry Ford already is, says Lassiter.
"I launched a company recently to do this, while Henry Ford has one of the longest tenured such groups in the country. Much of what I've been patterning our strategy here at Alameda is the stuff that Henry Ford has already done and already has great leaders in that respect."
For her part, after 2016 Schlichting expects to stay in the area, and says she will join more community boards with the idea of helping the area's youth.
"I'm staying for the next two years," she says. "But I've never waited to do things I have wanted to do. You never know what life is yet to be. I can contribute to the field in new and different ways and I'd like to do that."
Hospital and health system leaders see clear financial benefits from Medicaid expansion. But that's not the whole story. A deeper look reveals that Medicaid expansion is a critical, but perhaps not vital component of post-PPACA financial viability.
Depending on whether your state has expanded Medicaid, your hospital or health system likely either has sharply better financials or the same old bad ones. But the decision on whether or not to expand, though not in their control, is weighing heavily on hospitals.
In a side conversation at a recent HealthLeaders Media Roundtable, I asked a group of CFOs the consequences to their bottom lines of states' decisions either to expand Medicaid eligibility—and insure federal funding for the lion's share of the cost for the first few years—or decline that opportunity.
As of the end of August, 28 states had accepted Medicaid expansion, and two more, Utah and Indiana, were still debating whether to join. That leaves plenty of hospitals in states that have opted to forego expansion.
Medicaid expansion has two clear benefits to the bottom line, according to the CFOs I've talked with:
Charity care drops immediately and significantly.
Bad debt drops significantly.
But here's the surprising thing: revenue and net income pretty much hold steady. What gives?
Well, for one thing, it's early. Enrollments can be expected to extend to a greater share of the previously uninsured as time passes.
For another, uninsured or not, these patients are going to come to hospitals for treatment. In the past, such hospitals may have erred on the side of an admission, for example, because it was going to be paid for, so that revenue is going away—a negative, financially.
But the huge difference is now there's a payer—even if it's a poor one—where before there was none, for those who truly do need an inpatient admission. So far, for some, the net is near zero, but the hopeful takeaway is that people are likely being treated more appropriately.
What's clear is that the classification of revenue has changed, however. That has real impact.
A Tale of Two Systems One CFO who has hospital operations in 20 states, seven of which have expanded Medicaid, says 80% of his previously self-pay patient population is now Medicaid-eligible, and 20% is now health insurance exchange-eligible. So the expansion of Medicaid has become a very important component of reducing the self-pay population of those hospitals to potentially almost nothing.
Think about the time and effort that used to go into collecting those balances which is now freed up.
Even though he says adoption rates into the health insurance exchanges were initially low—about 25–30 percent of the population, and eligible Medicaid expansion adoption is far from 100%, it has led to a real reduction in the self-pay population.
For this CFO and his system, that translates to revenue that falls directly to the bottom line and benefits cash flow. In real terms, that means this health system has seen a 60% reduction in self-pay ED visits and a 67% reduction in self-pay admissions. Folks, that's real progress both financially and likely in clinical effectiveness.
Moving the Needle? Anecdotally, I have heard from other providers who say they have seen increases in volume, but that's occurring mostly on the outpatient side, and even where it is growing, inpatient admissions, generally, are increasing only to a small degree.
But does it move the needle, in terms of whether a hospital or health system feels it can survive without strategic partners in the long term?
For one health system CFO, the answer is no.
This organization, which has $750 million in annual revenue, sees itself as besieged with local competition, and with capital needs for its hospitals, its EMR, and equipment. Therefore a Medicaid expansion (that still has not yet come) could have deferred the decision to seek a strategic partner for as much as 18 months, but wouldn't have really changed the underlying equation.
It would have helped, but it wouldn't have gotten the organization to a 4% annual operating margin, which is the minimum its leaders feel it needs to continue in its current organizational structure.
So Medicaid expansion is a critical, but not necessary, component for thriving in the post-PPACA world.
This invitation-only event brings more than 40 healthcare CEOs together for two days of strategy sessions. Some highlighted topics: cost reduction, quality improvement, risk-sharing agreements and payer contracts.
With apologies to Andy Williams, HealthLeaders' annual CEO Exchange—this week in Colorado Springs—is the most wonderful time of the year, at least for me. At least professionally.
Nowhere else can I fill my notebook with more than a year's worth of story ideas and discussion topics in only two days. The reason: For those two days, I've got more than 40 of my most valuable sources all to myself to discuss the innovative ways they're transforming their healthcare organizations in a world that is changing quickly under their feet.
That's why they're here, after all. We invite well more than 40 CEOs to this event, which is supported by our sponsors. Of course, there are scheduling issues with many who would otherwise like to come. Others ignore our advances, passing up an opportunity to learn from others who are hard at work transforming their own organizations to compete within a system that's becoming more efficient, less harmful, and more useful for the customer: the patient.
I don't know about those who haven't joined us in Colorado Springs this week, but the group that is here wants to lead change. For them, the best and fastest way to do it is by sharing with their peers the newest and most innovative ideas for transformation.
Because the discussion sessions at the Exchange are "structured conversations," we take care to survey the participants before they arrive on what they feel is most important to discuss, and we incorporate those topics into our three roundtable sessions, which all CEOs attend.
For those who can't attend, we produce plenty of informative content from these sessions. I'll explore the themes and borrow sources from the Exchange for my coverage of leadership in the next dozen months, both in the magazine and here in my weekly column, but I have to admit: reading about it is an inadequate substitute.
WEBCAST: Telemedicine as Virtual Care: The Mercy and Nemours Models Date:October 21 1:00-2:30pm ET—presentations and live Q&A Leaders from Mercy Health System and Nemours reveal how they are using internal telemedicine and remote monitoring to reduce medical errors, improve response times, and alleviate alarm fatigue in frontline healthcare personnel. >>>Register
Leading up to this year's event, CEOs overwhelmingly indicated a preference to talk about
Cost reduction and efficiency gains
Investments in improving quality and patient safety
Risk-sharing agreements and payer contracts
Not surprisingly, those are areas in deep flux, and many organizations are trying tailored ideas that they feel can give their organizations the best chance at the ultimate goal: improving the health of the population they serve.
It's interesting to note that these executives picked those topics over reimbursement and the impact of health reform; mergers, acquisitions and clinical partnerships, maximizing the revenue cycle and clinical and information technology. That in itself is insight to me.
This is not to suggest that the challenges of leading innovative and thriving organizations can be boiled down to three bullet points. They can't. Which is why we spend hours discussing among a highly varied group of leaders the solutions they've tried, where they've failed, and how they assess the risks and rewards of trying something new. That difficult job can be made easier if there are other trusted leaders to rely on who have tried it before.
That the health of the local population has percolated to the top of CEOs' current strategic thinking is hopeful for all of us as future patients, because never before have so many leaders had the hope of the necessary financial alignment to help achieve those goals.
In many ways, they still don't, but the fact that offering value—not volume—is dominating the discourse, means initiatives that bring value are in a position to pay off, both financially and in the health of patients.
It will be interesting to find out what exactly is motivating these leaders and where they are innovating. Some are leading multi-hospital systems, some are leading critical access hospitals. You may not think initially that these two people have much in common, but they're struggling with many of the same challenges.
In our survey, dealing with the challenges of implementing data analytics in clinical decision-making was equally important for both types of CEOs. They can and do learn from each other, which is why they keep coming back, and why I do too.
Dealing with these shifting sands effectively is the CEOs' great challenge. Understanding where their organizations can lead change and where they must follow is a key CEO-level skill. Rewards for getting it right will be many, but penalties for getting it wrong will be equally devastating.
Yet that's what good CEOs ask for: a challenge and the opportunity to lead through it. These discussions will help them in that struggle, and will help me in bringing you new ideas and proven strategies for excelling in the future.
Managing the entire continuum of care may be beyond your organization's current capabilities, but that doesn't mean you can't try risk-based reimbursement through Medicare's bundled payment program.
Hospitals and health systems at the vanguard of managing a patient's entire spectrum of healthcare needs are few. Years of fee-for-service reimbursement combined with a desire to focus on their core competency has left many hospitals and health systems without owned components for managing the post-discharge experience for patients.
But a model that focuses exclusively on inpatient or acute care makes less and less sense as healthcare reimbursement makes the slow transition from fee-for-service to so-called value-based purchasing of healthcare services.
To a large degree, hospitals and health systems can still choose whether to participate in such value-based contracts—in other words, they're not being forced to change—yet. But even those that choose not to participate in such experiments generally acknowledge that it won't always be that way.
Eventually, they will have to learn to be accountable for outcomes.
Even those few organizations that do have experience in managing the post-acute side of care for patients discharged from their acute care settings are tilling new ground. Increasingly, there's money attached to managing a group of patients' healthcare needs such that the costs of managing that entire population will fall.
Hospital case managers have had some experience in arranging post-acute care for their patients, but those care settings have traditionally been detached from a continuum of care, and the hospital was not accountable for whether that care was delivered appropriately, safely or cost-effectively. In a majority of geographical areas, that remains so.
But it is changing.
Taking risk for the health of populations is the goal for many healthcare organizations—eventually. But ramping up the ability to take risk on populations is fraught with potential minefields. What if there was a way to sort of dip your toe into that world without betting the health of the entire organization on the outcome?
There is. Partnerships can provide a relatively low-risk way to begin dealing with risk. Medicare's Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative provides just such an opportunity.
Rich Roth
VP, Strategic Innovation, Dignity Health
Rich Roth, vice president of strategic innovation with Dignity Health, which has more than 40 hospitals and care centers in California, Arizona and Nevada, has taken the approach of partnering with a so-called "convener," a company that helps with tracking, coordination of care and improving metrics for organizations at the post-acute care level.
"It's really part of a broad move toward population health," says Roth. "There's a phenomenal opportunity with novel organizations that have deep expertise in one area, like patient engagement or coding, to marry those organizations with the deep healthcare expertise Dignity has and trying to figure out this new world together."
Roth says that within Dignity, there are certain geographic areas within the system where it makes sense to move toward a population health posture. In those areas, Dignity has signed a partnership with naviHealth, a convener.
NaviHealth works with Dignity's case management teams to work on readmission goals with the help of the company's depth of tech support and case management. It also uses that information and skill to help arrange and follow up with patients and their physicians on their post-acute rehab responsibilities.
"The opportunity we have in terms of care coordination allows physicians and hospitals to work together better than ever in history," Roth says. "These models really support aligning physicians on joint goals of quality, safety, and reducing the cost of care from a structural and economic standpoint. We're early but based on what we're seeing, we're rapidly expanding this to multiple other sites within the Dignity system."
Dignity is working in the Model 2 program, which includes the inpatient stay plus post-acute care bundle. The patient's care episode ends in 30, 60 or 90 days. Dignity had to meet CMS benchmarks on quality and on its clinically integrated physician network, but once accepted, enthusiastically went about working on aligning physicians, the hospital and post-acute care.
"We need to hit base levels of quality improvement," says Roth. "Above those, there's opportunity to share savings based on better management of the patients and overall reduced cost of care."
Healthcare organizations may apply to participate in the program's four available models. But that's just the beginning. The program can be a way to experience risk, but if it's not run well, with proper coordination of care with post-acute entities, for example, the hospital or health system could record lower revenues than by staying on Medicare Inpatient Fee for Service, which is their right.
I won't waste space here detailing the four models, but for those who aren't already intimately familiar with them, they can be found here.
More than 500 hospitals, health systems and other providers have enrolled in the program. NaviHealth's Clay Richards, the company's president and CEO, equates CMS's bundled care initiatives with "dipping your toe into risk-based population health management."
The company serves not only as a repository for technology, analytics, and highly skilled clinicians adept at navigating the continuum of care efficiently, but importantly, as a risk partner, says Richards. The focus on coordination of care can serve two purposes outside of the financial, he adds.
"This is a competitive advantage from the hospital because their service delivery through 90 days will be very differentiated from their competitor down the street," Richards says.
Also, a big selling point for the partnership is the fact that it can serve as a way to drive higher levels of integration with physicians, particularly independents, who bring volume to the hospital.
"We're looking for someone who really wants to collaborate around this, and we will go in and help set up some of those integrative arrangements with physicians," says Richards.
Historically, a bigger focus of naviHealth's business has been its work managing the care of almost 1.8 million members of Medicare Advantage plans. He says the move toward post-acute care coordination in the bundled payments initiatives involves much of the same type of work.
"Rarely do we talk to a CEO who says this isn't the way they want to go, but it's a matter of timing," says Richards. "The nice thing about this is it allows them to move closer [to taking risk] without requiring that they radically change their operating model."
Alan Pope, MD, vice president of medical affairs and chief medical officer for Lourdes Health System, a two-hospital system based in Camden and Willingboro, N.J., sees the BPCI project his system is doing with naviHealth and CMS as both an opportunity to improve the quality of care across the post-acute continuum, and as a way to experience "where things are headed" in terms of more expansive risk-based contracting that the hospital expects to have to deal with both from government payers and the commercial market.
That said, currently the system hasn't yet seen much interest in risk-based contracting from the commercial side.
Pope and the leadership team at the health system felt comfortable enrolling in some of the BPCI programs thanks to success it had with a recently completed three-year gainsharing effort it undertook through the New Jersey Hospital Association with CMS.
That program offered an opportunity on the acute side, but not the post-acute side to reward physicians if care was more efficient and better quality, he says, very similar to Model 1 of the BPCI program. That project got physicians' attention on both quality and financial incentives.
"It made the physicians aware that there's another world out there other than fee-for-service," says Pope. "It was a successful project for us in that we saw quality gains, decreased cost and length of stay in certain areas."
For Lourdes, the BPCI program represents a graduated, bite-sized approach to taking risk.
"Gainsharing was one step, this bundled care project is another step, and shared savings with commercial payers will be another step," Pope says. "Once we have a better feel for how we can manage, and we have a better handle on cost across the continuum in the post-acute setting, we would like to take on some risk fairly quickly—within next few years."
Pope says such projects have a definite appeal because of the potential financial rewards, but they may prove even more beneficial in forging stronger relationships and alignment with independent physicians.
"We developed this with independent primary care physicians in addition to our employed physicians to work together on our shared savings programs," he says.
As part of the program, the system has begun piloting using its hospitalists to provide post discharge dialog with home health agencies, for example.
"In doing that, we have better insight into what's going on with the patient and we believe it will reap rewards in better healthcare for the patient coming out of the hospital," he says.
What's unique about the convener partnership is that naviHealth has experience and data with post-acute market, and can prove utility in helping guide the patient to the next best step for post-acute care, Pope says, whether it's home health, skilled nursing, or acute rehab that will get patients back to functional status more quickly and with fewer complications.
The best part, he says, is that it "allowed us to manage the project without investing a lot of new resources and developing our own case management program for this," he says. "Instead we fall back on their experience."
Health systems are investing millions for better patient accounting systems. But integration between IT systems that bring money into the organization and those that catalog patient care is fraught with potential potholes.
This article first appeared in the July/August 2014 issue of HealthLeaders magazine.
Healthcare is in a state of upheaval. Nowhere is this more evident than in treasury management, where the ability of a health system to be paid for its work can be jeopardized thanks to a number of initiatives that threaten to slow or halt payment—from ICD-10 to new commercial payment models to the need to effectively integrate hospital and physician practice billing and collection.
At the same time, new points of revenue collection are opening up. Health systems are investing millions for better patient accounting systems. But integration between IT systems that bring money into the organization and those that catalog patient care is fraught with potential potholes. Further, consolidation in the industry means conversions of legacy systems, which provide further room for expensive delays and missteps.
Mission-critical revenue and accounting systems require working capital, which can be obtained, but cost savings from all this change are expected as well. Senior financial leaders are quickly learning how to manage the transition of their health system's most critical systems without costly breakdowns.
Healthcare providers are discovering strategic opportunities with large employers that are self-insured, but they need to be willing to partner more directly with payers and employers.
This article first appeared in the July/August 2014 issue of HealthLeaders magazine.
Delivering value is paramount to any healthcare executive who is fighting for his or her organization's place in the industry going forward. But the devil is in the details, and how you get there is dependent on a wide variety of factors. Two organizations—one that has already made the transition and one in the early stages of it—show that any executive who is hanging on to what currently works in healthcare (still largely volume-based fee-for-service reimbursement) is in a very dangerous situation.
So says Robert Mecklenburg, MD, medical director for the Center for Health Care Solutions at Virginia Mason, a Seattle-based system that includes a 336-licensed-bed hospital, a 460-plus multispecialty physician group practice, and a network of regional clinics. He knows of what he speaks; years ago, he and his colleagues at Virginia Mason found themselves in the kind of crisis that many of their peers are now facing. In fact, the Center for Health Care Solutions owes its very existence to a frank meeting between the health system's executives and local large employers that dates to 2004.
"They appreciated our innovations on adapting the Toyota production system to healthcare, but they said our healthcare was not affordable. They said, 'We're going to consider a variety of choices, including taking you off our network of providers,' " Mecklenburg says.
Quite a threat.
And quite an opportunity.
For all healthcare consumers, whether that consumer is a patient, a health plan, or an employer, one thing is clear: Seeking closer cooperation from employers and treating them as a partner to help reduce their cost of healthcare is a winning strategy.
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A sense of urgency
"There was an immediate sense of urgency, and you could call it even a crisis," says Mecklenburg of that initial meeting. "Not only would we not want to lose the business from these iconic multinational employers that are so important to our economy, but people say don't waste a good crisis. My job [at the time] as chief of medicine was to lead the change to a systems-based practice."
Mecklenburg first met with employer representatives and those of their third-party administrators in August 2004. In November 2004, representatives of those employers met with Virginia Mason's physicians and showed the physicians the cold market forces that were driving employers to consider other options.
"These were the people who were writing their checks," Mecklenburg says, noting that getting physician buy-in for making drastic changes in care protocols was immediate; he thinks a lot of that urgency developed because the doctors heard directly from the source. "Following that meeting, I asked them to come inside Virginia Mason in February 2005 and begin working on this together."
Mecklenburg says at this early stage, well before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and well before health plans began working directly with providers to help lower the cost of care, all constituencies in the Virginia Mason meetings realized health plans had to change the way they were paying for healthcare, and employers had to change the way they were buying it.
"If we just changed the production model, and purchasing and payment didn't change, we would get nowhere," Mecklenburg says. "All three had to happen."
To address this, the three partner groups (employers, the health system, and payers) created what they call marketplace collaboratives, where the groups would come together to mutually support and hold each other accountable in terms of delivering value to their common customers, defined as patients. That's a critical change, in that healthcare as an industry still lacks consistency on who the customer is. While the patient is always the one receiving the care, different areas of the health system might see the hospital as the customer, or the physician, or the employer. That problem still exists.
Defining the customer as the patient, says Mecklenburg, allowed the three groups to sit down together and work out the complex issues of curtailing unnecessary utilization or finding more cost-effective ways to move patients through a variety of care protocols, depending on the patient condition or diagnosis. The significant indication of the progress, he says, can be found in the fact that the employers have stuck with Virginia Mason and are convinced that it offers the best available value for their employees.
Managing populations
Much has been learned since Virginia Mason began its journey 10 years ago, but healthcare is regionally variable, and some areas of the country are just getting started on their value journey. They have seen that, often, they are their own worst enemy.
Troy Thibodeaux, CEO at Covenant Health-Lubbock in Texas, didn't need to have a meeting with local employers to know that his health system—with four hospitals and 977 licensed beds—needed to be more efficient. He just needed to look at the escalation in cost to cover the health system's own 5,000 employees. He hopes eventually to be able to work closely with employers—Thibodeaux attributes slow progress in that area in part to a lack of "large" employers (defined as employing 500 or more) in his region—but for now, the system is working more closely with insurers to help design care pathways that will eventually enable it to take risk on patient populations beyond its own employees.
Covenant certainly qualifies as a large employer, and that group represented the system's first shared savings experience. The partnership came relatively easily not only because it featured Covenant's own employees, but because the third-party administrator is the system's own health plan, FirstCare. Covenant Health Partners, a physician hospital organization with 320 physicians, is also heavily involved in helping move physicians from volume-based to value-based care protocols.
"We were successful in achieving significant savings," says Thibodeaux, who adds that since then, the health system has entered into "a couple" of other agreements on shared savings, one with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that feature local populations. The system is just starting those programs and, unsurprisingly, is focusing on moving toward population health management.
Thibodeaux says the system is not yet ready for total risk contracting, but it's getting closer through its work with local populations to better coordinate care for the chronically ill, where much of healthcare expense is found. It's using a population health management tool called Crimson and is extracting data from the health plan to help identify and intervene with such populations.
"There's two segments of that population we're focused on: navigating the chronically ill and the next category of patients, those at high risk of slipping into a chronic disease category," he says. "That's the key population. If we can reach them, it's less costly to apply preventive measures to that population, and the savings are huge."
Integration critical
None of this work is possible without physician cooperation on an unprecedented level. It helps to either have a clinic model of care, where all physicians are employees of the health system, as in Virginia Mason's case, or to have a strong and complete primary care network and alignment mechanism, as Covenant Health Partners does.
"That's absolutely critical," Thibodeaux says, "but you also have to have information sophistication at your fingertips to manage a population of patients. We're making significant investments in each of those, including patient and physician portals for health information exchange, as well as a significant increase in primary care and clinic integration."
Covenant Health is further preparing to take on risk for populations through formal partnerships with the federally qualified health centers in the area.
"Through one of these partnerships, we are utilizing care navigators in our ED to connect patients with the FQHC and a primary care provider," Thibodeaux says. "That's been very successful, and we've seen a 6% reduction in ED visits as well as a reduction in unnecessary return visits to the ED."
Of course, that means patient volume will inevitably decline.
"It's a double-edged sword," Thibodeaux says. "Our volume has gone down this year, too. But we track the patients we refer to them, and those patients are utilizing the ED less and becoming more compliant taking care of themselves."
Covenant began four evidence-based protocols a year and half ago, and Thibodeaux stresses that is a work in progress.
"We had success with two and were not so successful with two others," he says, mentioning general surgery and gastrointestinal departments as the bright spots. "We're hoping our new EMR will help drive more compliance with evidence-based protocols."
He sees particular opportunity in courting employers and payers, though.
"We are seeing employers, local ones, shopping the networks looking for lower cost and higher quality," he says. "We've already developed a narrow network product that we offered on the exchange through our owned insurance company."
Covenant intends to sell that narrow network not only to individuals but also to employers. It can be a mechanism to bid for school district contracts and some other employer contracts immediately. An important caveat to Covenant's current narrow network offerings, says Thibodeaux, is that they are not competitive from a price standpoint with Blue Cross and some of the other larger payers. The differentiator, he hopes, is that "with Crimson, we can demonstrate the quality and efficiency metrics. Premium's not everything."
Worrying about making the transition to value-based care can be debilitating. This transition fundamentally risks putting your organization out of business. If you do it right, your organization will definitely see lower inpatient volumes, and the risk of lower revenue is great. That's why executives have such a hard time knowing when to act and how strongly. But like Virginia Mason 10 years ago, they may find that once they dive in, revenue can be managed.
"While Virginia Mason did not have a decrease in revenue or patient volume to due value-based care, our real, fundamental problem was we had become burdened with a huge amount of waste," says Mecklenburg. "We could not support all that waste even with the ample revenue stream we had."
But Mecklenburg's challenge, as well as that facing his fellow executives, is that his job is to ensure optimum quality of care and reduce waste, while being attentive to the financial condition of the institution.
A helpful way to think about it, he says, is that some of the waste you're focused on eliminating represents part of the revenue stream. "In some cases, reduction in the waste in healthcare delivery is associated with reduced revenue. However, this is more than offset by increases in patient volume and a reduction in production costs, as it is a cost reduction strategy."
With that in mind, he says, "be mindful of revenue but take the cost structure down."
That means, among other changes, fewer FTEs, less imaging equipment, and using advanced registered nurse practitioners instead of doctors in certain cases. Further, you have to have the ability to have frank discussions with your payer and employer partners to make sure the journey is fair to the provider.
"When you start to look at these value streams, you may find that value-added care does not receive adequate reimbursement," he cautions.
He cites an example with Starbucks and its payer Aetna. Virginia Mason's team saw that for a true evidence-based process to be implemented for imaging, the decision rules for ordering MRIs would drop MRI volume by 20%.
Also, instead of using specialty consultants for back pain, Mecklenburg says, "we could reduce the cost of giving the care by using physical therapists instead of a specialist for uncomplicated back pain. When we did this, we improved cost for everyone; however, when we looked at the physical therapy visit, we actually lost money on that visit."
Mecklenburg says that with an open process, Starbucks and its benefits director were able to see proof that Virginia Mason had taken costs out, Starbucks saved money because of that, and the health plan had a better product to sell.
"But you can't get around the fundamental fact we needed a few more dollars for PT visits," Mecklenburg says. That boost in reimbursement was agreed to quickly through Starbucks and Aetna.
The key to making the transition is involving employers, payers, and when possible, providers, on the journey, Mecklenburg says.
"There's plenty of opportunity for everyone and there's no reason all three partners can't make contributions," he says. "But those who have a yestercare attitude do so at their peril, because market-based health reform is moving much more rapidly than the legislated agenda."
The future belongs to the nimble, the innovative and, perhaps most important, the efficient, says the CEO of the Providence-Swedish Health Alliance.
Change in healthcare may come glacially, but when it does come, the principles of biology, evolution, and natural selection offer a good analogy for what will happen in healthcare: only those who take chances will survive, one CEO says.
Joe Gifford, MD
As leader of the ACO formed by Providence Health & Services - Washington and Swedish Health System, Joe Gifford, MD, is on the forefront of an as-yet uncertain era for health systems, payers, and physicians. All three groups are under the gun to increasevalue by decreasing waste and overutilization and to right-size their infrastructure and cost structure.
An ACO created at least partially to work directly with employers, such as initial participant Boeing, the Alliance provides an ACO structure to two health systems that combined in 2012. Swedish became a division of Providence Health & Services, but they maintained their distinct identities, as Swedish is predominant in the greater Seattle area, while Providence is much larger regionally.
"This is no longer about creating high-margin institutional services, it's about serving populations efficiently for greater value," says Gifford. "That's a challenge for everyone's financials."
Surviving the fallout from such a transformation does involve risk, but it doesn't mean being rash. It means not being afraid to seek out new relationships and new partnerships to help solve the problem of high costs and poor outcomes locally.
So while part of the Alliance's reason for being is to cover both health systems' entire market geographically and expand the reach of both, it's also meant to serve broader communities with the same infrastructure.
If such a system has infrastructure that can provide 1,000 surgeries for a county over a given period of time, and that's being reduced, for example, because of efforts to reduce overutilization, Gifford's idea is to serve two counties with the same infrastructure. And making care convenient such that patients from such employers stay in network for their care is critical to managing the cost of that care, he says.
"Growing at primary care level is an important part of the strategy," he says. "On the other side of that, we do have within Providence and Swedish, some top-of-the-line, world-class subspecialists in some really specialized niches like neuro and cardio and others, and super-high quality services along those lines, which makes up a pretty nice portfolio."
On the surface, the Providence-Swedish Alliance is an ACO. But in reality, it's much more than that. It's a way to guarantee healthcare access for large employers such as Boeing, and to be able to better control and influence patient outcomes, another key, because the ACO structure provides incentives for reaching certain care targets and meeting benchmarks for care.
That can be better accomplished in a system that despite the different surface names of the facilities, is consistent, with the same electronic medical record system, clinical performance metrics, and back office functions.
Gifford believes healthcare is in an evolutionary stage right now that will leave some behind, while the Alliance shows the adaptability of Providence and Swedish. Growth in volume won't ensure hospital or even system longevity any longer. In the future, embracing the interconnections between care pathways and organizations that had been insular and protective will separate organizations that will thrive and those that will not.
"We are all interconnected in complex ways we never maybe have seen before," he says. "Healthcare represents a really complex ecosystem, and we have to talk to all [potential partners] and keep our minds open about connections and partnerships that will add value going forward."
So is taking a bigger piece of a shrinking pie the avenue for success? Partly, but it can't all be about survival of the fittest. Gifford maintains that success will be measured by how well healthcare entities and their partners service the customer—the patient, if you will.
Tactically, the combination of so many sites of care and avenues for patients to touch the interconnected health system provides a measure of safety as well as a template for adaptation. No longer will a change in care protocols mean one site of care will implement them and others will ignore them because they are not part of an integrated organization. He equates the changes coming in healthcare to a biological extinction event.
"When the climate changes or the meteorite hits, those who are most adaptable will survive—those who have not put all their chips on one bet," he says.
"You have to be willing to talk to all potential partners and find out how to add value. Even pharma and device companies, for example. How can we mutually serve the customer? No matter what, you're servicing a customer. You should always put yourself in their shoes. That's a great North Star for anyone moving into this world."
We're in the "gradually" phase right now. The "suddenly" part will be upon us before we know it.
Imagine you built a lemonade stand at which you could sell all the lemonade you could make for a dollar a cup. Wouldn't you do everything you could to produce as absolutely many cups of lemonade as possible?
If you were economically rational, you would. There would theoretically be no limit to your revenue, and by selling each cup of lemonade you simply add to your profit ad infinitum. While the way healthcare is bought and paid for is infinitely more complex than how lemonade is sold, for years, it has operated on a very similar economic model to my theoretical lemonade stand. (Sometimes you have to give the lemonade away for free, for example.)
Economic theory holds little sway in such a business, which is one reason why healthcare is on a crash course to try to inject the right incentives and measures into how decisions are made about healthcare services for individuals.
Now things are changing, but fee-for-service is still the dominant pay mechanism for health plans, government payers, and hospitals and health systems to this day. Many geographical regions seem to have plenty of pilot-type projects going on, but relatively few have gone further, at least up to now.
The lemonade-stand analogy is mired in fantasyland, of course. In no business can you infinitely grow through production alone—even in healthcare, there are limits to how many people you can reasonably say need drug-eluting stents, for example.
But the fact remains that no other business I can think of (except possibly college education, though that may be changing, too) has a system where to a large extent, suppliers have such power to create demand for the products and services they supply.
Of course, such an economic model is unsustainable—it requires a buyer that is as irrational as the seller is rational. But though it must fail, it can persist for a long time, as it turns out.
For a long while, that's what many of us thought about healthcare. Deep down, we knew it was not sustainable over time, yet runaway healthcare inflation was sustained for decades. Long enough that we got comfortable with it, ingrained in it, and maybe figured it would always be that way.
We're collectively finally seeing the bottom of the pit of money required to sustain such a model, so changes must be made.
But how, and how quickly? The major sources in a recent cover story I wrote for HealthLeaders magazine are either smart enough or naïve enough to try to innovate and play a part in changing this economic model both because patients, employers and payers are increasingly demanding it, and not least because it's the right thing to do.
This transformation is something I ask execs about no matter what the subject matter of the interview I'm conducting. Almost to a person, they freely admit they may be early, but suggest in the same breath that history will be on their side.
We fill the pages of the magazineeach month with ideas and solutions from those who are pioneers in moving toward demonstrated value. This story is no exception. These people are betting their careers on change.
We do research that helps them understand where their peers are on the transformation and our daily news is filled with stories of innovative partnerships that may be able to bend the cost curve and deliver a more rational economic model for the provision of an essential set of services that we will all need at one point or another.
My June cover story attempts to profile a few organizations that are taking the operational risk of being accountable for outcomes and cost of care. That's something, I've found in my reporting, that's simple to say, but immeasurably difficult to ingrain in your organization, no matter how insistent the call to change might be.
Yet value is making inroads into this hidebound, expensive, and dangerous historical economic model. As I often think about this transition—a stock question for CEOs I interview is how the transition from volume to value is going—I'm often reminded of what Mike, a character in Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises, says in response to a question about how he went bankrupt:
"'Two ways.'" Mike said. "'Gradually, and then suddenly.'"
I've not had a CEO phrase the healthcare transformation journey in quite that way yet, but I keep hoping. To put a more positive spin on that quote as it applies to healthcare accountability, I suspect we're in the "gradually" phase right now. The "suddenly" part will likely be upon us before we know it.
The historically adversarial relationship between providers and payers is shifting toward cautious cooperation as both sides recognize that they must implement structural and strategic changes to ensure their mutual survival.
This article appears in the June 2014 issue of HealthLeaders magazine.
It's taken for granted that Batman will always hate the Joker. Beatles fans may never quite trust fans of the Rolling Stones. Republicans and Democrats will never agree on much of anything. And hospitals will always hate health insurance companies. Except when they don't.
As incentives slowly change in healthcare, a sort of détente is emerging between some health systems and health insurers. And as collaborative arrangements evolve, payers and healthcare organizations are finding that they need each other in order to ensure their relevance in an industry that is remaking itself in an attempt to become more affordable and less dangerous to its end consumers.
In fact, hospitals, health systems, and health plans are finding that because they each have a vested interest in reducing waste and improving healthcare's value, they have a lot in common lately. In some cases, seeing the difference between the providers and the payers is getting more and more difficult as each comes closer to incorporating pieces of the healthcare continuum that were once the exclusive domains of the other.
Much tension still exists. For example, many hospitals and health systems are exploring alternative ways to contract directly with those who ultimately pay for care—individuals and employers—while third-party payers are trying to maintain leverage over hospitals and health systems by expanding into providing care themselves. Many leaders on both sides resort to the old tendency to view healthcare payment as a zero-sum game: If providers win, health plans lose; if health plans win, providers lose. Increasingly, however, that sort of thinking is being replaced by a spirit of cautious cooperation.
Collaboration instead of conflict?
In the past, and even up to the present in many areas, payers and providers have struggled to work together primarily because the business model pitted the two against each other—and negotiations determined the winner or the loser. The payer tried to get rates as low as possible in its drive for profits, while the providers tried to negotiate rates as high as possible in the same drive to generate margin.
"In this type of relationship, trust is almost impossible to establish," says Charles Kennedy, MD, CEO of Accountable Care Solutions for Hartford, Connecticut–based Aetna, a healthcare benefits company with 2013 revenue exceeding $47 billion.
But he says Aetna is trying to break the mold through a variety of risk-sharing incentives under which both the provider and the payer are aligned.
"We seek to … more tightly link the future of the provider with the future of the payer," he says. "We want it to be that when you work with Aetna, you win when we win, and we win when you win."
That is easier said than done. It involves a lot of work on process measures as well as compensation structures (reimbursement based on outcomes has yet to truly take hold), but Kennedy says Aetna follows a blueprint in negotiations with providers—whether they be hospitals or health systems or large physician practices—that forms a foundation for risk contracting on both sides.
"Providers can look at the contract and they can see that Aetna is going to be successful only if and when they are," he says. "Then you have the business model foundation for trust, and as you move forward you can expand that relationship."
That expansion involves what Kennedy describes as enablement.
He calls it that because he says most hospitals and health systems are not set up to be successful in risk-based contracting, so they need a lot of help setting up structures, incorporating new skills to their labor force, and better coordinating care and tracking how well they're doing so that the incentives can be reached.
Not all provider organizations are waiting for payers to help them establish the new modalities to improve care and cut costs. Catholic Health Initiatives, which is based in Englewood, Colorado, and owns or operates 89 hospitals and other facilities in 18 states, has partnered with health insurers, but it also has internal strategic transformational vehicles to help the organization become more accountable and to take advantage of the reimbursement risk that's been added into revenue and margin projections.
In general, Dean Swindle, who is the president of enterprise business lines and chief financial officer at CHI, says the organization is beginning to see better relationships with payers that involve a level of win-win in contracting. But "there are not a lot of them, and the ones that do exist are small."
Not satisfied with this piecemeal approach toward transformation, CHI has developed risk-taking capabilities on its own. It recently acquired a Medicare Advantage health plan and is busily integrating it into its suite of products. Swindle says CHI has not yet decided whether it wants to go further into developing its own health plan or group of health plans; it remains a possibility, but could conceivably cause problems with other payers with which CHI works.
"As we go into things like Medicare Advantage, most payers seem to feel that it's not hitting their core business yet; but realistically, there may be repercussions," he says. "That may impact our ability to work together, and both will have to find that balance."
Digging into data
That's a strategy-level conundrum, but at the practical level, there are a couple of examples of progress being made where, traditionally, providers and payers have been polarized around sharing the claims data that payers have understandably guarded very closely.
Juan Serrano, a veteran health plan executive, is now CHI's senior vice president of payer strategy and operations, a function that is part of that effort to expand the organization's capabilities in cooperation with payers and employers.
Serrano says such shared incentives are critical to eventually managing the health of populations because the level of detail needed on the provider side for clinicians to focus on high-value interventions for patients with chronic conditions, for example, is beyond the ability of most health systems to incorporate alone.
Some health plans are providing this information not just with unit costs, but also with even more detail, which enables comparisons and helps tailor cost-effective care. An example of this greater detail would be statistics on total cost of care for a given episode of care in the given market. That data allows the health plan to prove that the provider is either very valuable to the health plan (and by proxy, patients and employers) versus competitors, or show where it falls short.
"This enables people to rally around how to solve problems as opposed to negotiating," says Serrano.
He notes that longitudinal total cost of care for a population is, in a way, a foundational prerequisite for understanding all the moving parts that come together to improve both outcomes and the cost of serving that population. For example, an aggregate snapshot of pharmacy, lab, physician, and hospital claims for certain services can provide a previously unavailable sight line for a particular physician group.
"That's one piece of the so-called longitudinal data that's needed," he says.
Serrano says it's important also to measure the impact of referral patterns on cost and quality measures.
"The physician community has received reports from payers showing how they compare to their peers on cost and some quality measures, but getting more granularity on the impact their referral patterns are having on outcomes from a cost and quality perspective enables the health system to rally and think about ways to solve these types of issues," he says.
Serrano also would like to see potential payer partners offer more specificity around the types of products and services on which the payer is interested in partnering.
"Historically, this has been pretty global in that they want you to serve all their commercial or government program members," he says. "But value is created at a more granular level."
G. Anton Decker, MD, is president of the board of directors at Banner Health Network and chief medical officer of the Banner Medical Group, a Phoenix-based system that operates 24 hospitals in seven states and reported 2013 total revenues of $5 billion. His organization has partnered with Aetna in an accountable care collaboration called the Aetna Whole Health Plan. Decker says many physicians and practices are still living in the fee-for-service age, but that age is rapidly coming to a close with initiatives like the Banner-Aetna partnership.
"Ten years ago, there were a lot of theories that doctors would be paid on performance and data would be shared in the future. Everyone knew it would happen but didn't know when or how," says Decker, a gastroenterologist. "But now it's an absolute reality. Physicians see their data, their colleagues' data, and how they measure up with national benchmarking. Sharing of that data and differential reward for superior performance is a reality and people aren't questioning it."
At the same time, what can be difficult is assessing the accuracy of the data.
"If I'm going to pay a doc differently based on how they perform, the data has to get into the system accurately," he says. "Who's putting it in? Is it automated? All those steps create room for error."
Through the partnership with Aetna, among other initiatives, Banner has cleaned up patient data so that "now there's a lot more trust, and that data is becoming actionable," he says.
When physicians get annoyed by data comparisons—and sometimes they do—Decker reminds them that transforming to being measured on value added is a long transition. However, he's insistent that data given to physicians to measure their performance must be as accurate as possible.
Banner has clearly hammered out some of the challenges, because its results in such accountable programs are impressive. Its case management model, which is independent of any specific contract with an insurer, lowered its average inpatient length of stay across 11 hospitals to 3.81, a 7.52% improvement since the program was enacted. And although some organizations that initially joined CMS' Pioneer ACO program dropped out after the first year largely because they weren't able to achieve much in the way of savings, Banner's Pioneer ACO recorded more than $13 million in shared savings over its first year.
Open access versus ACO
Some health plans are trying to get better value from providers by incorporating them into an accountable care organization of some kind. Some argue that allowing patients to seek care from providers who are not contractually linked to the ACO taints the population data and makes hospitals and physician practices accountable for care patients obtain from providers outside of their systems.
While that's true, says Dick Salmon, MD, medical director for Hartford-based Cigna, the patient and the payer alike ultimately benefit from the patient's relative freedom to seek care where they choose. Cigna is a global health service company with annual revenues of about $29 billion.
While Cigna operates 89 ACOs in 27 states, these structures allow open access. That is, patients are not required to seek care within the parameters of the ACO, although there are incentives for them to do so. Branded as "collaborative accountable care," the name is intended to indicate that the health plan provides services to healthcare professionals to help them optimize their care of patients—it's not just the provider who's doing the work on patient satisfaction, quality improvement, and cost containment.
Salmon says Cigna members prefer the open-access model for a variety of reasons, but chief among them is a belief that restricting where the patient can receive care doesn't force providers and hospitals and health systems to make themselves attractive to patients so that they want to stay in the same system whenever possible.
Participants in the Cigna program must have achieved patient-centered medical home standards, are committed to provide care set by the NCQA, and must commit to a dedicated embedded care coordinator. Collaborative accountable care debuted with Cigna in 2008, and by 2010, a study in the journal Health Affairs showed that its Arizona practice recorded per member, per month costs that were $27.04 more favorable than its comparison group. Quality measures were improved versus the peer groups, in Texas and New Hampshire, although cost differences were deemed insignificant.
"It does put a challenge on the groups. Certainly physicians would much prefer if most of the patients they were responsible for were in a more limited network," he says. "But this means they have to offer services the patients want so that patients voluntarily use them for their care."
He says in Cigna's experience, open access has encouraged physician groups to extend office hours, send reminders to patients, and generally make a greater effort to maintain oversight of that patient's care.
"It's just better customer service because of this structure. That drives a higher level of patient care," Salmon says.
He explains that in shared-savings programs like the ACOs Cigna operates regionally, the financial reward for provider participation is only one of several incentives. Another is increased patient volume; partners that show above-average ranks in quality and cost are prominently featured in tiered and network products to encourage patient growth. A third reward is increased professional satisfaction for physicians.
"We're striving to help the primary care physician who's been encouraged to see more patients more and more rapidly in order to make a living," Salmon says. "In these arrangements, how many patients you see a day is no longer a key metric; how well you take care of them is. Currency for services does not fully reward care coordination."
What also might be toxic is that many ACOs are still ramping up their management and technological capabilities to fully take advantage of their partners' ability to actually manage care, especially of populations that utilize the most expensive sites of care most often, such as those who use or who are more likely to use the emergency room or to be admitted as an inpatient. Aetna's Kennedy says the most important work the insurer is doing right now is adding to the number of programs with its partners to make them as financially successful as possible.
"There is a foundational set of care management programs and technologies, but over the next year, you'll see us add to those capabilities," Kennedy says. "By next year, we'll be able to say we have a new business model for healthcare with all the programs and technologies to make it work, including clinical and claims data integration, analytics based on clinical indicators, and process reengineering to reconfigure what they do and how they do it."
One reason Aetna is well positioned to help "enable" providers such as Banner is because its goal, where possible, is to offer what it calls "payer-neutral tools" to help organizations to demonstrate improved value. For instance, Aetna's tools, largely analytical and predictive in nature, help Banner improve the value proposition for its ACO populations, including Pioneer ACO, even though Medicare patients, not Aetna patients, are attributed to that structure.
Across all patient populations served by Banner ACOs, the structure recorded the following improvements between 2011 and 2012, the latest period for which comparison information is available:
3.0%–5.5% medical cost savings
1.0%–8.0% increase in PCP visits
7.0%–8.0% reduction in hospital admissions
0.5%–1.0% reduction in hospital readmission rate
3.0%–7.0% reduction in high-tech radiology utilization
The numbers represent a range of results based on the patient population being measured, and the results are not blended. For instance, the lowest medical cost savings during the period measured were 3.0% for one group, while the group on the high end of the range saved 5.5%. One direct correlation to those results is that the Aetna commercial products associated with the Banner Health Network ACO populations are priced anywhere from 8% to 15% below prevailing rates in the market, according to the insurer.
Another example of such results comes from Carilion Clinic in Roanoke, Virginia, which has 3,000 participants in a shared-savings ACO with Aetna, which was formed in 2011.
Compared with 2011, 2012–2013 results show that patients in the Aetna ACO saw 6% fewer inpatient days and had 23% fewer avoidable emergency department visits and 10% fewer high-tech imaging scans. The ACO reduced its readmission rate to 4.9% from 5.6%.
Banner's Decker says a big part of helping physicians integrate processes that help achieve this type of savings includes educating them on so-called big data principles.
"The bigger the data pool, there's a greater tolerance of small inaccuracies because the overall story is probably still accurate," he says. "The bigger the data gets, it almost becomes more philosophical, and an individual arguing that a small piece of data is inaccurate doesn't change the overall story."
Banner Medical Group had just less than three million discrete patient contacts in 2013. "We're getting physicians to understand the concepts of big data and maybe become less defensive about individual cases that are inaccurate," Decker says. "I'm a provider myself, but what relaxed me is that this is not aimed at individuals. If you look at overall performance for the year, there's a story to be told there."
Chuck Lehn, Banner Health Network's CEO, agrees that a lot of work still needs to be done for the partnership ACO with Aetna to operate most efficiently, and echoes his clinical colleague, Decker, about the constant learning that is going on among physicians as they transition to a completely different method of evaluating their value to the organization, from revenue generation to quality and efficiency.
"We're still learning how to integrate cost information with clinical information," Lehn says. "The link between cost and quality is an emerging science."
But Decker sees evidence of uptake among physicians, saying that, very slowly, they are starting to talk among themselves about how much the things that they do cost. "The leader is often the doctor who spends less," he says. "That never used to be the language 15 years ago, but now you hear it once a week."
And Lehn says the level of transparency around the data doctors use to compare themselves against their peers is improving dramatically. "If you're sharing risk, then everyone has to understand what's driving the costs and where the costs are."
Banner has finalized another ACO deal with UnitedHealthcare, Lehn says. The organizations have worked together for years, but this is the first accountable care program for the two, and it will become effective July 1. Part of the difficulty in negotiations for such partnerships is that both sides have to come to agreement on historical cost trends, because the health system will be rewarded for how they mitigate the increase in those trends going forward.
Moving toward capitation, narrow networks
What all of these complex moving parts, culture transformation, and big data integration are leading to ultimately can be boiled down to one word: capitation. But the transformation to that type of payment, in which a provider negotiates a per member, per month fee for taking on a patient's medical risk, is filled with baby steps in order to successfully make such a dramatic transition. So hybrids will continue to move the dial toward capitation in the meantime.
Cigna's Salmon says providers currently are most comfortable with an upside shared-savings model in negotiations, as 90% of Cigna's patients are still in open-access PPO plans. Shared-savings regimes of one kind or another are common, but the insurer plans to progress over several years to models that also share downside risk.
"Eventually we'll move toward capitation models, which we already have with our Medicare Advantage and managed care population in California," he says.
Aetna's Kennedy contends narrow networks (sometimes these are also called ACOs, adding to confusion) are proliferating widely because of the strong economic incentives to create them. This is one reason Aetna finds it can play an important role in creating accountability for financial and quality outcomes that are so important in switching the business model from volume to value.
"In the PPO world, in broad networks it's very challenging to create financial accountability," he says. If anyone can go anywhere anytime for service, it's difficult to hold hospitals accountable for their performance on a certain group of members."
He says Aetna typically surrounds the narrow network with the "normal" Aetna PPO network so that in special cases where the narrow network does not have the capability the patient needs, he or she can still get access.
"This harnesses the power of a narrow network of 10,000–20,000 members. Here's the network they're attributed to so we can more easily hold physicians accountable for their clinical and financial performance," says Kennedy. "People should not walk away with the perception that they don't have access in an uncommon or severe health event. This is more of a tiering network strategy."
Strategic diversification = less cooperation?
All of this activity doesn't guarantee that payers and providers will always be able to work effectively in a collaborative manner. Some organizations may feel they need to control as much of the healthcare continuum as possible to make the transformation work in their favor.
With that in mind, some health plans have been acquiring providers and even hospitals. Likewise, some hospitals have acquired or are planning to resurrect their own health plans—plans that may have been jettisoned years ago as they proved largely unable to compete with large national insurance companies like Cigna, Aetna, WellPoint, UnitedHealthcare, and state Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans.
But is this kind of branching out a good idea strategically? Cigna's Salmon is skeptical of such incursions.
"It's actually quite complicated to run an integrated delivery system. It's also hugely complicated and sophisticated to run a health plan," he says. "We don't underestimate the skills necessary for running an IDS, so they shouldn't underestimate the skills to effectively run a health plan."
He believes Cigna's branded health plan partnerships with medical groups, for example, may offer as good a return, ultimately, with less risk for providers.
"In Texas, we have Kelsey Care powered by Cigna," he says, mentioning a branded health plan in partnership with Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, one of Houston's largest physician practices. Cigna also has high-performing collaborative accountable care groups in 11 markets. "The groups that are doing that need a mechanism to capture patient volume, and we can help them," he says.
Aetna's Kennedy is somewhat less pessimistic about such crossover, but he still feels organizations are best served sticking to their core competencies. He says many provider groups, which already understand how to deliver healthcare exceptionally well, might figure that if they're already taking risk through an ACO or multiple ACOs, that it couldn't be much more work to simply become a full-fledged health plan.
He believes they may have some success with this diversification strategy in their local geography—in the individual market and small employer groups—but beyond that, the geographic limitations make their product unappealing to large employers.
"So they'll grow to a particular size but probably won't have much success beyond that," he says.
But that doesn't mean Aetna wouldn't be willing to work with them on that strategy.
"We can extend their reach and make any health plan opportunity they pursue more successful," says Kennedy.
CHI's Serrano says the hospital giant is interested in making the switch from volume to value as quickly as possible. Because CHI has a presence in many different regions, the pace of change varies dramatically. That means in some areas without insurer or employer support, it can be more difficult to make the switch just by partnering with insurers alone.
"We can accelerate the switch by making some of the moves that we think we could also make as a partner with a health insurer, but in many regions, they're reluctant," Serrano says.
"By fielding our own products, we're putting together clinically integrated networks, and taking the initiative to make those moves starts our internal cultural transformation sooner," he says.
Doing this work organically, and through providing services that traditionally are offered only by health plans, CHI hospitals and regions can learn what it's like to be in a mode of reimbursement that conflicts with delivering volumes of services.
"Starting up some of these business channels is putting our money where our mouth is," Serrano says. "It's a lot easier to say to patients and employers if you're already doing it, that you can demonstrate the value you can bring."
Serrano says even in the early innings of the value transformation attempt, payers have moved closer to providers, and in many markets, they are demonstrating success in vertical integration.
But he says the process is often slow. The employer community has begun to show signs of impatience because while employers' third-party administrators or health insurance partners might have a lot of programs aimed at improving value, those aren't necessarily connected to the healthcare delivery system.
"In the larger urban markets, we're telling employers that we can be part of accelerating support for employees—not necessarily taking over for their insurer or third-party administrator, but employers are now actively seeking out health system partners," Serrano says.
Scale is critical, which is why at this point, only the largest of health systems are even investigating competing with health plans on their own turf. To truly move forward in population health management, developing high-performing networks, or even in owning health plans, even the largest health systems likely won't be able to match the geographic reach and economic depth of most large health insurers.
"That may be a differentiator for us," says Serrano. "We're well positioned to do that."
Will the value proposition stick?
Cigna's Salmon is optimistic that its collaborative accountable care (CAC) groups with large physician clinics will soon be the dominant way in which it does business with providers. From the 36 active CACs in 2012, Cigna expects to have more than 100 by the end of this year.
"We see this type of initiative growing, and that will offer continued growth to groups that are developing the capabilities necessary to participate," he says. "And 100 won't be the end of it."
CHI's Swindle says the experimentation going on across the country means the eventual answer to bringing better value to healthcare services is still unknown—perhaps something "none of us has thought of yet. "We're constantly pushing to find the format to be successful, but we have to be flexible enough to go left if the industry is telling us to do that," he says. "We don't know if we want to be a health plan, but we will have to integrate some of what they do."
He believes CHI's foray into Medicare Advantage is a good learning lab for determining whether further investment in a health plan structure is warranted.
"A lot of health systems are going through this—maybe they're not as deliberate as we are," says Swindle.
Whatever way the industry shakes out over the next decade or so, Aetna's Kennedy says expectations are high and people have to keep in mind that healthcare providers, from the smallest one-physician practice to the largest health system, are working to fundamentally change their business model—"something that's very difficult.
"If you're not careful, you can threaten the financial viability of the organization," he says. "The complexity and risk in shifting is not to be underestimated."
Struggling with how to operationalize that shift is common because the very notion of what a physician does and is accountable for is changing fundamentally.
"This will take five years or more to play out," Kennedy says. "Organizations that get it right will be dominant. Quite a few will get it wrong or choose not to pursue accountable care and find themselves in financial difficulty."
And quite a few organizations are still taking a wait-and-see attitude.
"One would understand why they might," Kennedy admits. "Many attempts in the past that have been billed as 'the next big thing' have fizzled and not created the value that was anticipated."
He mentions many programs, such as disease management or HMOs, that have failed to live up to their initial transformational billing.
"Players are making a very risky bet in this circumstance because this is much bigger than disease management," he says. "It involves changing the mechanism of how healthcare is bought and paid for, and I'm seeing change in the industry on a scale I've never seen before. Those who don't embrace value-based care are putting their organization at substantial risk and may regret that strategy."
Reprint HLR0614-2
This article appears in the June 2014 issue of HealthLeaders magazine.