When weighted for enrollment, more than 68% of enrollees in plans with prescription drug benefits are in contracts with four or more stars, a three percentage point drop from 2016.
Nearly half of the nation's 364 Medicare Advantage plans with prescription drug benefits (MA-PD) earned four stars or higher in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services five-star scoring scheme for 2017, CMS reported Thursday.
When weighted for enrollment, more than 68% of MA-PD enrollees are in contracts with four or more stars, a three percentage point drop from 2016. In addition, the number of active and rated contracts, and the percent of MA-PD enrollees weighted by enrollment in contracts with four or more stars in 2017, is approximately the same as in 2016.
When weighted by enrollment, more than 90% of MA-PD enrollees are in contracts with ratings of 3.5 or more stars, CMS said.
Sean Cavanaugh, deputy administrator and director of the Center for Medicare, said in a blog post this week that Medicare's prescription drug programs have improved significantly in the past decade. In 2009, for example, only 27% of enrollees were in plans with four stars or more.
"Plans that are rated higher deliver a higher level of care, such as improving the coordination of care, helping enrollees to manage diabetes or other chronic conditions more efficiently, screening for and preventing illnesses, or making sure people get much-needed prescription drugs," Cavanaugh said.
"A high rating also means that these plans give better customer service, with fewer complaints or long waits for care."
For the 55 Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) rated in 2017, 49% (27 contracts) received four or more stars. When weighted by enrollment, 41% of PDP enrollees are in contracts with four or more stars, which represents a nine percentage point increase from 2016, CMS said.
Two plans were slapped with a low-performing Icon:
Phoenix Health Plans, Inc., a subsidiary of Tenet Healthcare Corporation, with 13,777 enrollees
GHS Managed Health Care Plans, Inc., a subsidiary of Health Care Service Corporation, with 4,550 enrollees.
Both plans received summary ratings of 2.5 stars or less from 2015 through 2017, which means that their contracts with Medicare could be terminated in 2017 if they don't improve.
As in past years, non-profit plans continued to outperform for-profit plans in the 2017 Star Rankings for MA-PDs. Approximately 70% of non-profit plans received four or more stars, compared with only 39% of for-profit MA-PDs. And, just as in 2016, 63% of non-profit PDPs received four or more stars, compared with only 24% of for-profit PDPs.
As in prior years, the length of time that a particular plan had with Medicare Advantage was another key indicator of success. More than 56% of the MA-PD plans that earned four or more stars have been involved with the program for more than 10 years. None of the 59 MA-PD contracts with five years or fewer experience in Medicare Advantage earned five stars, while more than 47% of earned three or fewer stars. View full details.
Methodology
For the 2017 Star Ratings, CMS said outcomes and intermediate outcomes continue to be weighted three times as much as process measures, and patient experience and access measures are weighted 1.5 times as much as process measures.
For the 2017 Star Ratings, outcomes and intermediate outcomes are weighted three times as much as process measures, and patient experience and access measures are weighted 1.5 times as much as process measures. CMS assigns a weight of 1 to all new measures. The Part C and D quality improvement measures receive a weight of 5 to further reward contracts for care improvements provided to Medicare enrollees.
For the past eight years, Sevier County in East Tennessee has partnered with a federally qualified health center to provide remote access to basic acute- and primary-care services for more than 14,000 students in the county's public school system.
The promise of telemedicine is delivering now in East Tennessee.
For the past eight years, the public schools of Sevier County, located just east of Knoxville, have relied on Cherokee Health Systems to provide more than 11,000 acute and primary care episodes and screenings for the system's 14,000 students.
In the 2015–16 school year alone, there were 1,631 visits across 23 schools in Sevier County, the largest rural school district in the Volunteer State,
It's a program that measures its return on investment with metrics such as reduced absenteeism and improved access to care. Before the affiliation, it was not uncommon for as many as 20% of the students and educators at Sevier County schools to be stricken during flu season, forcing school-wide closures.
In the past five years, however, there have been no school closings in the county due to the flu, and program organizers at the federally qualified health clinic and the school system credit the partnership.
Deb Murph, RN, COO at Knoxville-based Cherokee Health Systems, says the main emphasis of the telemedicine program is to keep children in school by addressing health issues early and pre-emptively inside the school walls and eliminating travel time to clinicians' offices.
"If they were having to leave and get checked for an acute illness they would have to leave school and that usually means a half-day missed or more than that," Murph says. "The ideal was to place the services where the children are located and address their acute healthcare needs on the spot instead of having them leave."
Providing access to care inside the school also means that a parent or another relative in the more isolated areas of Sevier County (with a median family income of $40,000, about $4,000 below the state average) may not have to take time away from work to either bring a student to a clinician's office, or stay with them at home.
Tallying the Cost
Murph says the cost of the telemedicine visits are about 15% to 20% higher than an office visit, but that does not account for the saved travel time, avoided absenteeism on students and teachers, and time away from work for their parents.
Under the program, which requires parental consent, students are screened for acute and potentially contagious health issues such as strep throat and flu by a school district nurse, who decides if an uplinked telemedicine visit over a secure site for the students with a Cherokee Health nurse practitioner is needed for a more comprehensive exam.
The Cherokee Health nurse practitioner can provide real-time diagnoses and treatment plans, or refer students for more complex care, all of which is coordinated with the school nurse, the students and their families.
In addition, the telemedicine visits are used to monitor chronic conditions for some students, such as high blood pressure and diabetes, and to promote sound preventive medicine, and proper nutrition. As part of routine exams, students are often examined for lice, bed bugs, and other skin irritation issues during the tele-conferences.
When we talk about the potential of telemedicine to improve access to care for isolated patients in rural America; to provide pre-emptive primary care that addresses health issues early and before they become more problematic; and to engage patients in their own health, that is exactly what is happening in this relationship between Sevier County's public schools and Cherokee Health.
The results of a survey of physicians practices "can be seen as a referendum not just on the current state of quality measurements of physicians, but also of electronic medical records," says the lead study author.
This article was originally published on March 9, 2016.
Physician practices spend more than $15.4 billion each year reporting quality measures that nearly three out of four physicians believe do not reflect the best measures of quality, according to a study this week in Health Affairs.
Researchers from Weill Cornell Medical College and the Medical Group Management Association surveyed 394 physician practices from across the nation found that physicians and their staff averaged 15.1 hours per physician per week processing quality metrics, which is the equivalent of 785.2 hours per physician per year, at an average cost of $40,069 per physician per year.
The survey, funded in large part by The Physicians Foundation, found that physicians spent 2.6 hours per week dealing with quality measures, time that could have been used to provide care for an additional nine patients. The times spent processing data varied greatly depending upon the practice specialty.
Specialists spent considerably less time and money on reporting data when compared with primary care physicians. For example, primary care doctors averaged 3.9 hours per week dealing with quality measures, compared with 1.1 hours for orthopedists, with an average annual cost of $50,468 for PCPs, compared with $31,471 for orthopedists.
"To some extent our survey can be seen as a referendum not just on the current state of quality measurements of physicians, but also of electronic medical records," says study lead author Lawrence Casalino, MD, with the Department of Healthcare Policy and Research at Weill Cornell Medical College. "We are talking about substantial amounts of time—$40,000 per physician per year, almost three hours a week, and a lot more time from staff. That's not trivial."
Casalino spoke with HealthLeaders Media about the survey findings. The following is an edited transcript.
HLM: Why did you do this study?
Casalino: I do a lot of research involving physicians. Having to deal with [quality measures] is one of their chief complaints. There have been a lot of anecdotes, but not much evidence over the years about how much time this is really taking from them. We thought we would take a look at that.
HLM: What are physicians telling you?
Casalino: We had a free text area in the survey where anyone could write what they wanted. Here's one person: 'You get so focused on making sure that you are clicking the right fields in the (electronic medical record) that you lose touch and connection with the patients. It is very sad what medicine has come to.' That's a family practice physician. An orthopedic surgeon wrote: 'The current system for measuring 'quality' is simply a reporting mechanism for documenting check boxes, not really an indication of a person's health.'
HLM: Your survey found that only one-in-four physicians believe that the quality measures moderately or strongly represent quality of care. Please explain that disconnect.
Casalino: The physicians' view is that some of the quality measures record things that are real, but maybe not as important as things that aren't measured. It's like looking for the keys under the lamppost because that's where the light is better. For example, diagnosis, how well a physician does diagnosis is not measured by any quality measure, but that may be the most important single thing a physician does.
Physicians understand that and they respect other physicians who are good diagnosticians. They don't necessarily respect other physicians who remember to check all the right boxes in the EMR.
I don't mean to imply that these quality measures are useless. Diabetics should get annual retinal exams. They should get A1Cs checked regularly. Women should get mammograms. Those things are measured by quality.
But the general physician perception is that only 27% of practices thought the measures were moderately or highly representative of their quality of care. The percentage that actually used the measures to improve quality in their practice was similar.
In the long run, the idea of using systematic processes to improve the health of your entire population of patients in your practice is the right idea. Simply doing the best you can for whatever patient is in front of you while they are in front of you isn't enough anymore. But from the individual physician's point of view they see it as more hassles interfering with their ability to spend time with their patients and an unfunded mandate.
HLM: How do you strike a balance between reporting quality measures and reducing hassles for physician practices?
Casalino: We need better measures and there is a lot of work going on in that area. We need more measures for specialists, because right now the burden is very heavy on the primary care physicians. The measures for specific specialties, there are very few of them.
It'd be nice if these measures evolve so that they better measure quality. Some of the things that might count, such as avoidable readmissions, you can't really measure that at the level of an individual physician.
The numbers of patients aren't large enough to get statistically reliable results. The more meaningful the measure is, the harder it is to do for all but the very largest and really large organizations. That is a real problem. Therefore, the measures tend to be things that you can measure and get statistical reliability. So the measure isn't 5% one year and 80% the next year and 30% the next year for the same physician, which is what can happen if you only have measures for seven patients.
That is a particularly big problem because the [Sustainable Growth Rate] fix mandates value-based payments going down to the level of the individual physician. [The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services] is grappling right now with the Congressional mandate to do that, and how they are going to carry that out.
The two biggest things that would help are first of all, standardization of the measures. We didn't go into too much detail in the study, but it just drives practices crazy when you have lots and lots of different measures for diabetes that are almost the same, but not quite coming from different health plans. There is no excuse for that. It just kind of happened, and once it happened there is a cost for everyone to make a change, particularly payers.
The Core Quality Measures Collaborative goal of standardizing measures would be a big help. The other thing that would be a big help is that if EMR are better designed so that quality data could be either sucked out of them by external entities, or easily generated by the practices themselves and easily sent to the external entity.
The more that things can be measured without anyone having to do extra work, the better this will be. But we are a long way from that right now.
HLM: How do you see this playing out over the next five or 10 years?
Casalino: It's hard to predict a timeframe, but eventually we will get to a place where the measures are fairly standardized. And the measures ought to keep getting better and more meaningful, and where it is possible, to get them out of the EMR when it's possible. That is the direction we're moving. The frustration is that there hasn't been a lot of rapid progress with EMRs and measures not being standardized.
In the meantime, if you wanted to dramatize it, a whole generation of physicians is being sacrificed. It's great to measure things. It's great to have EMRs. The reorganization of the healthcare system is by and large a good thing. But for the hundreds of thousands of physicians who have to live through it this is very tough.
For them, it's all burden and no benefit as far as they can see. It's a lot of work that they don't get rewarded for, and they're not convinced that it is making care better for their patients. It's been that way for a while, and it doesn't look like it is going to change soon.
The TN-based not-for-profit health system more than doubled its size this week with the acquisition of four hospitals in Mississippi and Florida.
Curae Health, Inc.CEO and President Steve Clapp spoke with HealthLeaders Media this week about the acquisition of four hospitals, what it will mean for the not-for-profit hospital chain, and the communities that these hospital serve.
Curae executives believe these small community hospitals will benefit from an affiliation with a smaller company that specializes in operating in rural settings.
The following is a lightly edited transcript.
HLM: These acquisitions will more than double the size of Curae. What is prompting this?
Clapp: When we formed Curae Health in 2014, the intent was to help identify and work with small rural hospitals such as this, and that has been the opportunity that was presented to us.
We've looked at nearly 50 hospitals over the past year, which illustrates the challenges and the desire for hospitals to align with larger institutions. With us being a nonprofit, rural-focused-only company, that has created a lot of interest.
HLM: Do these hospitals make money?
Clapp: They are profitable facilities, but it is probably CHS's place to comment on that.
HLM: How do you make this work financially?
Clapp: As a non-profit organization, we are not paying corporate federal income tax, so we get some relief there. We are able to participate in the 340B Drug Pricing Program as long as we meet the criteria.
These are cost-reduction strategies that are not available to the for-profit sector, so we are able to lower our operating expenses below what for-profit organization can realize.
The second strategy has been focusing on the revenue opportunities and the volume retention inside the community. Our company is purely focused on what services we can provide and patients we can retain in our communities.
When they leave the community for tertiary level services, we don't necessarily concern ourselves with where they go. We are trying to move to what probably and more properly could stay in the community. We are trying to develop that service and expand the outpatient side so we can reduce the outmigration.
The third thing is, we are a smaller company, so we can provide lower overhead costs as well.
HLM: Do you have economies of scale, or will these hospitals be independent of one another?
Clapp: We will be able to realize some economies of scale. We've already got an executive team, so you're not adding to the C-suite leadership. Now, it's a matter of adding staffing and management position, but we aren't going to have add a whole lot of higher ups.
HLM: Changing these hospitals to nonprofit means a loss of tax revenues for these communities. How have they responded?
Clapp: We are talking with them. There is a potential loss of some of that revenue, but some of the property will continue to pay property taxes, for instance on the medical office building. We also hope to add jobs back in, so there is a larger employee base in the community as we build up the complement of services.
We hope to offset the potential tax loss with an increase number of jobs in the local community, as well as allowing patients to stay home for more services.
If you look at the number of rural hospitals that have closed across the country, a lot of people don't want to be in that boat.
So while there is a chance that it could affect part of the property taxes, we are trying to position these things so we can keep the hospitals open longer for the community benefit. These hospitals are usually the largest employer in a community. They pay the highest wages in the market, and they are a vital piece to recruit industry in a community.
HLM: What changes will the people in these communities see at these four hospitals in the months ahead?
Clapp: Being a nonprofit, we have a responsibility to be good stewards of the assets. Part of our model is we keep the local boards in place. They will continue to have the local authority for oversight of medical staff, budget approval, credentialing, and strategic planning approval.
Our model is very integrated with the local medical staff, the local boards, to help us develop the direction for the hospital that is needed in that community.
I see it as a community partnership approach. This is the business that we are responsible for taking care of, and it requires all of our input. We're hoping that it is a more open and participatory process as we go through it.
HLM: Where does Curae get its funding?
Clapp: We were able to acquire the original hospitals from LifePoint through bank loans. We were able to refinance some debt at the end of last year to add some capital to acquire services and equipment for these hospitals.
We are working with our bank partners to grow and add the capital and financial resources we need. We also have used a real estate investment trust to help us with financing, to raise capital as part of our strategy.
HLM: What is the value of the CHS acquisitions?
Clapp: I have agreed with CHS that that is their area to comment on.
HLM: What has to happen for Curae to succeed?
Clapp: What we add to the equation is a working and living knowledge that says 'we understand small towns and the challenges they face. We can relate.' If you're not from a small town, sometimes it is hard to relate. I know that sounds odd, but from my perspective it's a big deal, because I know what it is like to live in a town of 8,000 because I have all my life.
The second thing is we have to be a disciplined operator of hospitals. We have to have a successful team that has the experience of managing multiple facilities. We are identifying the best processes to put in place. We are trying to build that management team that has the broader experience to grow this company and manage it properly.
Third, we have to perform. We have to execute on the strategies we have that we have developed with the medical staff, the management team and the local communities.
HLM: What will be the common traits of Curae hospitals?
Clapp: First and foremost, we are a rural hospital operator. We will not be in metropolitan markets. The second thing is we want to be a well-run hospital company. Our model is focused on retention of patients and recapturing the patients back into the community and building the confidence of those individuals who are seeking services outside.
To do that we have to have a good plan and know what we are and what we are not. We won't most likely ever be doing open-heart or neurosurgery in our hospitals.
But what we should be doing is outpatient cardiac, outpatient oncology, and the predominant primary care hospital services; general surgery, GI, inpatient medicine, swing beds, general psych, medical detox, etc. There is going to be a certain core set of services that are going to be developed and provided in our hospitals that maybe tertiary doesn't focus on.
You talk about a culture around a hospital company; we want to be extremely good corporate citizens and community stewards of the assets.
As a nonprofit we have an obligation to our communities and to our board that says we are a good community partner. Whether that is working with students who may want to come in, or fundraising activities, we also have a role as a community citizen.
HLM: Do you anticipate affiliations with larger health systems?
Clapp: Yes. As we go into these markets we look for the opportunities for clinical affiliations that would benefit our hospitals and the communities they serve.
HLM: How big can Curae get?
Clapp: Curae is going to have a southeastern footprint. We have had opportunities to look at hospitals outside of the region, but we realized that here's where you get the efficiencies of operations and management and the ability of sharing resources, and that would include medical staff between two hospitals that are close to each other.
But, we have some more hospitals that we are looking at. So, there is an opportunity for us to have more hospitals within the network.
A federal prosecutor blasts Tenet for 'taking advantage of vulnerable pregnant women in clear violation of the law.' A kickback and bribe scheme allegedly helped the hospital chain obtain more than $145 million in Medicaid and Medicare funds based on illegal patient referrals.
Tenet Healthcare Corporation and two subsidiaries will pay more than $513 million to resolve criminal charges and civil whistleblower suits for a kickback scheme that illegally steered more than 20,000 undocumented, pregnant Medicaid recipients to Tenet Atlanta-area hospitals, the Department of Justice said Monday.
Two hospitals that were managed under subsidiary Tenet HealthSystem Medical Inc. will plead guilty to conspiracy to defraud Medicare and Medicaid, and to paying kickbacks and bribes in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute as part of the investigation. The deal was announced in August and finalized this week, but awaits a judge's approval in U.S. District Court in Atlanta.
In criminal and civil complaints, federal and Georgia state prosecutors alleged that in 2013 and 2014 THSM Inc.'s Atlanta Medical Center Inc., North Fulton Medical Center Inc., Spalding Regional Medical Center Inc. and Hilton Head Hospital paid bribes and kickbacks to the operators of Clinica de la Mama prenatal care clinics serving primarily undocumented Hispanic women in return for the referral of those patients for labor and delivery medical services at Tenet hospitals.
These kickbacks and bribes allegedly helped Tenet obtain more than $145 million in Medicaid and Medicare funds based on the resulting patient referrals, DOJ said.
Prosecutors said expectant mothers were told at the clinics that Medicaid would cover the costs associated with their childbirth and the care of their newborn only if they delivered at Tenet hospitals.
In some cases, the women were told that they were required to deliver at Tenet hospitals, leaving them with the false belief that they could not pick the hospital of their choice. As a result, prosecutors said many expectant mothers traveled long distances from their homes to deliver at Tenet hospitals, putting their health and safety and that of their newborn babies at risk.
Prosecutor: 'Tenet Cheated' Medicaid
"Our Medicaid system is premised on a patient's ability to make an informed choice about where to seek care without undue interference from those seeking to make a profit," John Horn, U.S. Attorney of the Northern District of Georgia, said in prepared remarks.
"Tenet cheated the Medicaid system by paying bribes and kickbacks to a pre-natal clinic to unlawfully refer over 20,000 Medicaid patients to the hospitals," Horn said. "In so doing, they exploited some of the most vulnerable members of our community and took advantage of a payment system designed to ensure that underprivileged patients have choices in receiving care."
In the civil settlement, Tenet, the nation's third-largest for-profit hospital chain, will pay $368 million to the federal government, the state of Georgia and the state of South Carolina to resolve claims in a whistleblower lawsuit filed by Ralph D. Williams.
The federal share of the civil settlement is $244 million; Georgia will recover $122.8 million; South Carolina gets $892,125; and Williams gets $84.4 million. Tenet will also retain an independent compliance monitor for at least three years to address and reduce the risk of any recurrence of violations of the anti-kickback statutes by any of its hospitals, DOJ said.
Other Tenet Actions
Tenet Chairman and CEO Trevor Fetter said Monday his for-profit hospital chain's "conduct in this matter was unacceptable and failed to live up to our high expectations for integrity."
"The relationships between the four hospitals and Clinica de la Mama violated the explicit requirements of our compliance program and were inconsistent with the strong culture of compliance we've worked hard to establish at Tenet," Fetter said in prepared remarks.
"We take seriously our responsibility to operate our business in accordance with the highest ethical standards, every day and in every interaction."
The criminal complaint against Tenet notes that the executives who worked at Atlanta Medical Center, and North Fulton Medical Center "concealed material facts" of the scheme from Tenet lawyers and outside counsel "because they knew that the agreements would not be approved if the true nature of the Clinica arrangements were disclosed to lawyers." Tenet said that the executives involved in the scheme no longer work for the hospital chain.
This week's settlement marks the latest brush with the law for Tenet, which in 2012 was fined $42.7 million after the company self-disclosed overbilling Medicare for services provided by inpatient rehabilitation facilities. In 2006, Tenet agreed to pay more than $900 million to settle an investigation of alleged unlawful billing practices, primarily through improper "upcoding," and "outlier" payments for inflated charges.
Atlanta Medical Center, North Fulton Medical Center, were sold to WellStar on April 1.
Healthcare leaders need to find the right partners and strategies as they take the leap into value-based care.
This article first appeared in the October 2016 issue of HealthLeaders magazine.
Hospital consolidations have become a weekly event across the United States, and the pace and scope of these consolidations is getting faster and bigger. In 2015, the number of hospital transactions increased to 112, up 18% over 2014's 95 deals, which, according to a study from consultants Kaufman, Hall & Associates, LLC, includes mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and joint operating agreements. Such activity is more than 70% greater than the 2010 level of 66 deals.
Hospital leaders say these consolidations are driven by a big push from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and commercial payers toward population health and risk-bearing, value-based care, which require economies of scale.
"When the ACA said you had to have an electronic health record and the ACA expects everyone to move to population health, that doesn't come cheap," says Christopher G. Dawes, president and CEO of Lucile Packard Children's Hospital Stanford and Stanford Children's Health in Palo Alto, California. "You have to buy these very sophisticated computer systems. We are a moderately sized hospital, and we purchased an electronic health record system that cost us more than $110 million, with the acquisition price and training. That is obviously a lot of money."
Creating the infrastructure to provide population health is also labor intensive.
"That is dozens and dozens of people who are focused on population management, doing the analytics, and involved with sales and managing activities and managing utilization," Dawes says. "If you are going to get into population management, you can't do that as a small player. You don't have the critical mass to make the math work. The pediatric and adult world are being pushed into larger entities, and they need to get some value out of the scale."
Even as the pace of hospital consolidations is accelerating, the process is evolving, and that means hospital leaders must adapt.
"Historically there were two kinds of mergers and acquisitions," says Michael D. Williams, founding president and CEO of Plano, Texas-based Community Hospital Corporation. "It was the investor-owned sector looking for those hospitals that had been poorly managed, that they could gain low-hanging fruit in a short period of time. It was acquisition for the purpose of growing the revenue stream and the bottom line.
"On the not-for-profit side," he says, "it was that spoke-and-hub mindset of 'If we can go out and acquire enough of the surrounding smaller hospitals, we can get a greater percentage of the referrals and we are the tertiary center, we can be more successful.' "
What has changed, Williams says, is that both the investor-owned and not-for-profit sectors have become more selective about the hospitals they're acquiring.
"They are looking for the already high-performing hospitals that can be acquired to complement their own portfolio," he says. "The not-for-profit sector organizations are saying, 'No longer can we afford to go out and acquire smaller hospitals or community-based midsize institutions and accept the liability associated with their bottom line. We have to be creative in determining new types of relationships that will bring us what we need and want, but without accepting that liability.' "
Examining the options
University Hospital in downtown Newark, New Jersey, exemplifies many of the challenges threatening the survival of stand-alone hospitals in an evolving healthcare delivery landscape.
The money-losing, state-owned, 325-staffed-bed academic medical center serving some of the city's poorest neighborhoods controls about 14% of an over-bedded five-hospital market that since 1999 has seen six hospitals close.
A 2015 state-commissioned report found significant duplication of services in a Newark regional market that serves 670,000 people. The report noted that UH and the four other hospitals lost a combined $32 million in 2013 and would lose $190 million by 2019, excluding a state charity care subsidy, under an unsustainable status quo. As the state moves toward a population health model, the report said, action is needed to reduce the number of inpatient beds, consolidate specialty care in certain hospitals, and better coordinate outpatient and primary care.
This is the challenge that John N. Kastanis accepted when he took over as CEO at UH in March 2016. A turnaround specialist, Kastanis was lauded for his leadership at Temple University Hospital in Philadelphia, where, in less than five years, he stanched the red ink at the 722-bed academic medical center and improved quality rankings.
While he expects to face many of the same challenges at UH in the coming months, Kastanis says he doesn't expect a cookie-cutter response as the hospital considers its affiliation options. "You've heard the adage: When you've seen one academic medical center, you've seen one academic medical center. We're all unalike. We all have our separate histories, different traditions, and the cultures vary."
The common factor at Temple University Hospital and Newark's University Hospital is a committed medical staff that understands the link between margin and mission, and is willing to adapt to new care models, he says.
"When you have a solid core of medical staff who remain dedicated and committed to the hospital where they are affiliated, you still have potential," Kastanis says. "The medical staff are very excited about the new leadership of the hospital. They all have great ideas about expanding their existing respective clinical programs and adding new ones. That was one of the main reasons I took the job."
Another reason why Kastanis took the job was to develop a population health collaborative—called for by the state report—with Rutgers Health and the newly merged, 11-hospital RWJBarnabas Health.
"We need the capital to keep pace with all the new technological advances, and we are going to need significant dollars to upgrade and possibly replace our facilities. That is all going to come from collaborations and partnerships."
"I'm excited about the chance to work from a regional strategic plan that improves on the delivery of care on all levels, not just the tertiary and quaternary care that UH provides," Kastanis says, "but also at the primary care level and preventive level and reaching out into the community and aligning ourselves better with each other and with other providers, whether it is the federally qualified health centers or other community-based providers."
One key challenge will be determining where to provide care and where to trim inpatient services in a region that is over-bedded. Another problem is money.
"We want to continue to promote academic medicine at University Hospital, but where do you find the financial resources to make this happen?" Kastanis says. "Also, we need the capital to keep pace with all the new technological advances, and we are going to need significant dollars to upgrade and possibly replace our facilities. That is all going to come from collaborations and partnerships. It gets a little tricky with us being a public, state-owned hospital. There are ways to do it, perhaps a public-private partnership, but those models are out there and they can be replicated."
As UH builds affiliations with Rutgers Health, RWJBarnabas Health, and other providers in the region, Kastanis says the academic medical center cannot afford to lose focus on improvement.
"This can be achieved, for example, by combining existing high-acute and specialty services at other hospitals with University Hospital, while possibly repurposing the new affiliate hospitals into ambulatory sites. Also, current New Jersey assets and liabilities (e.g., facilities, property, pension plans) can be retained by the state while University Hospital is managed by a private corporation, allowing for more versatility in management, planning, and financing, and functioning more effectively in an ever-evolving competitive healthcare marketplace," he says.
"We have to be a lot more efficient in the way we provide care, even at the high-acute, tertiary, quaternary levels," he says. "That's high cost, but we have to learn, being an academic medical center, to be that much more cost efficient. That is a big challenge. I did it at Temple in a pretty successful way, and I plan to do it here. I have medical staff who are willing to see what they can do to change their practice patterns, to redesign and try to be more efficient in patient throughput at the academic level."
Physician integration is inherent in hospital partnerships and affiliations to achieve clinical efficiencies. After Rutgers Health launched in April 2016 the faculty committed to a transformation process that included best practice reviews, redesign, and new, value-based clinical pathways.
Creating different models for physician integration should also be in the mix when collaborating with physicians. At Temple University Health System, for example, Kastanis says community-based physicians were hired part-time and full-time to cover off-site ambulatory care facilities and medical homes through a separate corporate enterprise called Temple Physicians Incorporated.
Finding the right fit
For many stand-alone or independent hospitals, a common way to adapt to population health and value-based care and to enjoy virtually instant economies of scale is to merge into a larger health system.
CHC's Williams says smaller, midsize, and community hospitals looking for the right partner or partners must first understand out-migration to learn where their patients are being referred by the physicians who practice at the hospital.
"If those referrals are to multiple sites for cancer, cardiac work, etc., yes, the relational iterations of specialization could create an organization with more than one partner," he says. "But it has to be based upon the medical staff relationships—historically and where they are going to be going in the future."
Smaller hospitals that want to merge with larger systems must remove emotion from the process, Williams says, and focus on optimizing the bottom line.
"Before anything happens, before you put yourself on the market for any type of relationship, you have to be assured that you are optimally performing," he says. "When you sell, it's going to be a multiple of your cash flow or EBIDTA. If you have multiple organizations competing for you, you want to be optimally performing so that when they look at you they want to include you in their population health provider base. All of that has got to be fact-based."
Once the financial assessment is completed, the smaller hospital has to determine what it needs from a merger. Williams riffs on a handful of questions that hospital leaders should ask themselves: "Do you need clinical collaboration, and if so in what areas? Do you need managed care clout and negotiation clout in working with the major payers based on what you think your reimbursement might be? Do you need access to medical staff, for either rotational or a full-time presence in your community? Do you need continuing education for your team? What do you need and who can provide that within the organizations that are looking to acquire or create some relationship with you?"
Increasingly in the not-for-profit sector, larger organizations are less inclined to acquire smaller hospitals, and instead are more interested in clinical collaborations and physician recruiting.
"We have one client for whom the tertiary center was able to provide a group of cardiologists who were willing to come to the community and staff an outpatient center," Williams says. "The presence of those cardiologists in that market has been a significant financial benefit to that local hospital. But that larger institution saw a great opportunity to grow their cardiac business if in fact they did something differently."
"If your hospital doesn't have a strong pediatric program, how do you move into this population health management arena, which is driving a lot of these consolidations and partnerships? How do you do that to attract young families, the part of the population you want to serve?"
Doing it "differently" meant that the larger institution saw the opportunity to partner with the cardiology group to enhance the continuum of care rather than compete with it in the secondary market. An integrated IT infrastructure between the two organizations also enhanced the relationship, says Williams.
Developing a modified hub-and-spoke model
The traditional brick-and-mortar acquisitions are still occurring, but, increasingly, the more-nimble affiliation models are fulfilling the same objectives without limiting opportunities to collaborate with several providers on a broader array of services.
Dawes says the Stanford Children's population health model provides excellent opportunities to expand its pediatric specialty and OB-GYN footprint in the Bay Area. "If your hospital doesn't have a strong pediatric program, how do you move into this population health management arena, which is driving a lot of these consolidations and partnerships? How do you do that to attract young families, the part of the population you want to serve?" he says.
Stanford Children's has joint ventures with five adult acute care hospitals in the Bay Area, using a variation on the hub-and-spoke model. "We are the central hub, but the difference is the spokes have little hubs on the ends," he says. "We reach out to a place like John Muir Medical Center, for example, and they become a hub for the local community, and the more complex stuff comes back to the central hub, which is us." The John Muir facility is about 50 miles north of Palo Alto in Walnut Creek, California.
The widespread shortage of pediatric specialists in virtually all parts of the United States also furthers the drive to affiliate with children's hospitals. "Because of that we are seeing, in certain cases, partnerships are being formed with major children's hospitals to get the access to pediatric expertise so you can manage the population of pediatric patients," Dawes says.
He describes Stanford Children's as "a freestanding children's hospital that is accessing the ACO world with our partnership with our sister hospital Stanford Healthcare, but also partnerships with others around the Bay Area.
"In other areas, you're seeing children's hospitals, such as ours, who are seeking partners because we want to be able to play in the ACO world, and in order to do that we need access to adults as well," he says. "So, both sides are motivated in that regard."
The key to success with any joint venture, Dawes says, is that the deal has to benefit everyone. "The host hospital gets the value of first-class pediatric care. They don't have to pay for it directly because it's part of the JV, but they get first-class pediatric care in their communities so they can attract patients to their hospitals. Keep in mind that women make most of the key healthcare decisions in a family, and the first experience that a young family has with a hospital is typically the birth of their first child. This is a way for these entities to attract young families."
These affiliations also require a common set of values and a strong sense of trust between executive and clinical leaders, and a strong governing and operations structure that sets priorities and metrics. "Lastly, we have to deliver pediatricians and pediatric specialists to these hospitals so we can fulfill our commitment," Dawes says.
Dawes describes the JVs that Stanford enters into with other hospitals as a hybrid that attempts to garner all the advantages of a traditional merger while maintaining the autonomy of each hospital. It is stronger than a mere referral network because Stanford specialists work in these JV hospitals with their employed or affiliate physicians to coordinate care, as opposed to merely accepting referrals.
The JVs give Stanford Children's access to nearby markets without having to buy them. "We create a partnership, and now we are in a community and we can serve that community," Dawes says. "We attract less-acute patients to their local host hospital, and the high-end cases come to us. It gives us greater market share in these communities. It remains local, but in some cases the business comes to us. And it's been very effective and been the impetus for us to substantially increase our market share in the Bay Area."
While the rewards are enticing, Dawes says the process is difficult. "It takes a lot of energy and time," he says. "One could argue that it is easier to acquire. But from our viewpoint, our ability to JV with multiple parties allows us to access a much bigger market."
Evolving payer models
As the provider side consolidates, so too has the payer side, which has led to a chicken-or-egg argument about who's responsible for all this merger, acquisition, and alignment activity.
"It takes a lot of energy and time. One could argue that it is easier to acquire. But from our viewpoint, our ability to JV with multiple parties allows us to access a much bigger market."
Michael T. Rowan, president of health system delivery and chief operating officer at Englewood, Colorado-based Catholic Health Initiatives, says it's been interesting to watch how payers evolve.
"If you look at some of the payers, there are three things that historically they do," Rowan says. "One, they put together a network of providers, so you start to get larger health systems and they have a natural network of providers. Two, the payers historically have managed benefits. Larger and more sophisticated organizations may be keen to do some of that for themselves. Three, they put together various products to sell out there, and more and more if you have an integrated delivery network you can begin to put together a product which includes long-term care, ambulatory care, diagnostic services, and inpatient care and home care and primary care and the like.
"So, you can begin to start to see some of the friction because some of the things that historically the payers have done, larger and more sophisticated integrated networks are capable of doing that now," Rowan says.
Dawes at Stanford Children's says payers' enthusiasm for provider consolidation swings both ways. "Sometimes payers encourage it because they are focused on building networks," he says. "Other times payers are less enthusiastic because we are a high-end place and it gives us access to more markets, which means it gives us more leverage as well. Overall, the payers certainly haven't responded negatively."
Robert A. Marino, chairman and CEO of Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, says payers are simply adapting to the new market created by the ACA's push for population health, and the consequent consolidation of provider networks. While leverage was once a key motivator for providers and payers, Marino says other factors are coming to the fore.
"If you were to ask me three years ago, I would have said the main motivator for provider consolidation is market share and leverage with payers," he says. "But, over the past three years as this value-based movement has gained traction, there are hospitals and health systems out there that are trying to consolidate to create greater value in terms of acquiring a full continuum of healthcare access for inpatients/outpatients, doctors' offices, and freestanding facilities, as well as positioning themselves to be able to move toward value-based payments.
"Many of these systems that have consolidated in New Jersey are working with us to move toward population management with the ultimate goal of accepting risk for managing a population of patients and keeping them healthy," he says. "The proof for me as I see hospital consolidations in our market has been the fact that those systems that have consolidated are truly motivated toward moving to a value-based system."
In fall 2015, Horizon launched a preferred provider network in New Jersey called OMNIA Health Alliance that includes six of the largest hospital systems and one large multispecialty practice group.
"It's an innovative approach that changes the historical relationship between the payer and provider from one that was based on an annual fight over rates, to a longer-term view of how do we move this system toward a value-based system in which the focus will be on population management, keeping patients well, keeping patients out of the hospital, engaging the patients in their care, engaging them in preventive care, and lastly the ability of all of that to lower the total cost of care," Marino says. "Another aspect of what we believe is very innovative about this partnership is that over a period of time these providers will actually assume financial risk for the well-being of their populations that are assigned to them."
For OMNIA's partner providers, Marino says Horizon provides a pathway to full capitated risk that begins with shared savings, transitions to risk corridors after two years, and then transitions to full global capitated risk several years after that.
Marino describes OMNIA as a tiered network, "not a narrow network."
"We took our largest managed care network, and we created tiers within that network. This was done in response to a tremendous amount of research the company has done over the past several years, where our customers have told us that healthcare costs in New Jersey are unaffordable and they were looking for a lower-cost quality options," he says.
Horizon customers who select an OMNIA product will see an average premium reduction of 15%. "If they choose to do that, they will see little, if any ... out-of-pocket costs in terms of even a deductible or coinsurance," Marino says. "If they use a provider in the broader network of what we classify as Tier Two, they will have out-of-pocket costs that are very similar to the out-of-pocket costs they pay today."
Since its launch in late 2015, more than 235,000 of Horizon's 3.8 million members have joined OMNIA. "When you look at these 235,000 members, 175,000 of them are individual consumers who write a check every month to pay for their healthcare," Marino says. "That is the market that has been crushed by healthcare costs and 41,000 of those 175,000 individual consumers were previously uninsured in the state of New Jersey."
Hospitals that were invited to join Tier One had to meet key metrics. "Obviously, quality was important, as was their history and ability to demonstrate past performance in value-based care, the scope of services offered, the ability and readiness of the hospital systems to accept risk," Marino says.
When OMNIA launched, hospitals that were not in Tier One complained that they were placed at a competitive disadvantage with their top tier competitors, a claim Marino disputes.
"We have reached out to every one of those hospitals and said, 'If you are interested in working with Horizon on value-based care and payment innovation models, that invitation is there. It's not a monopoly that the only hospital systems that will have access to payment innovation models are the Tier One hospitals,' " he says.
University Hospital was one of the providers that didn't make the Tier One cut, and Kastanis says he wasn't surprised. "I don't see a lot of Horizon Blue Cross patients here, other than those who come through our emergency department. The elective admissions from that third-party payer are minimal," he says.
Still, Kastanis wants UH to be a Tier One provider. "In my first week here I met with Robert [Marino] and we talked about the criteria they used to categorize the hospitals in New Jersey into Tier One and Tier Two. They articulated very clearly the clinical metrics that they wanted to see from those in Tier One because they were going to create incentives for their beneficiaries to go to Tier One hospitals with no deductibles and reduced or no copays," he says.
"The quid pro quo for the Tier One hospitals is they are going to get a discounted reimbursement rate but they are going to get more volume. Guess what: Places that can do that really need scale to absorb and take at-risk the management of these types of patients who are coming to you with a discounted rate."
Kastanis says UH "doesn't quite have that."
"You have to have the confidence and the know-how to do it, and you have to prove to the third-party payer that you really have good clinical outcomes and great patient satisfaction scores; that is going to convince Horizon that they are going to have a good result and good feedback from their beneficiaries," Kastanis says. "Coming here as a newcomer I have to be realistic. We don't have the scale. We can't take a discounted rate just yet. I can pound my chest and say, 'Hey, I'm the only academic medical center in the whole Newark area. We should automatically be included in Tier One!' But, it doesn't hold water."
Marino says UH has clear challenges as an inner-city hospital serving a poorer, sicker patient population, but that some inroads are being made. "The good news is John and I and our staffs have agreed to do some payment innovation models with them," he says. "We are working with University Hospitals here in Newark on a charity program. There is a very significant problem with preterm births at University Hospital, and we are collaborating to improve the health of the mothers and the babies as well. John recognizes that they may not have all the criteria in place, but we are willing to work with any hospital that wants to move in that direction, and clearly John does."
Kastanis sees Tier One status as a long-term goal, one of many affiliations that University Hospital will work toward as the healthcare landscape evolves.
"Specific to OB-GYN they offered that episode of care and I accepted it. I was showing them I am willing to work with them," he says. "It's going to be a gradual improvement in credibility between the two of us to get into Tier One, and I can live with that."
Hershey Medical Center and PinnacleHealth weigh their options after district court ruling is overturned and appellate judges grant a preliminary injunction to block the merger.
A federal appeals court on Tuesday granted a preliminary injunction that blocks the merger of Pennsylvania's PinnacleHealth System and Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center.
In a unanimous ruling, a three-judge panel at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned a May 9 ruling in district court and said that the trial court "erred in both its formulation and its application of the proper legal test."
The preliminary injunction had been sought by the Federal Trade Commission and the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office, which had claimed that the merger of PinnacleHealth, a Harrisburg-based three-hospital system based, and Hershey Medical, a 551-bed academic medical center, would create a dominant acute care provider that would hinder competition in the four-county service area.
"The FTC is very pleased with today's ruling from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which found that we have a likelihood of success on the merits," said Debbie Feinstein, director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition. "We look forward to proving our case."
PinnacleHealth and Hershey on Tuesday issued a joint statement saying they were "disappointed by the court's ruling. Over the next several days, the leadership and respective boards of both organizations will carefully review the decision, and together we will determine our next course of action."
The preliminary injunction means that, if the two hospital pursue the merger, any further arguments would be heard before an administrative law judge who works for the FTC.
An appeal of that ruling would go to the commission that voted out the complaint in the first place. An appeal of the commission ruling would go back to the appeals court under substantial deference.
The appeals court said it found three errors in the district court ruling, which came after a five-day hearing last spring.
"First, by relying almost exclusively on the number of patients that enter the proposed market, the District Court's analysis more closely aligns with a discredited economic theory, not the hypothetical monopolist test," the appeals court wrote in a 46-page ruling.
"Second, the district court focused on the likely response of patients to a price increase, completely neglecting any mention of the likely response of insurers. Third, the district court grounded its reasoning, in part, on the private agreements between the hospitals and two insurers, even though these types of private contracts are not relevant to the hypothetical monopolist test."
Jay Levine, a disinterested observer and Washington, DC-based antitrust litigator with Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, says the district court's ruling in support of the merger relied in part on the Elzinga-Hogarty test, which was not designed for the task.
The Elzinga-Hogarty Test
"The district court, when it was trying to determine the scope of the geographic market, relied heavily on where the hospitals draw their patients from, and within those ZIP Codes, where do patients go to," Levine says.
"It saw that a lot of these patients are going to other hospitals, which indicated to the court that the geographic market is broader and therefore includes more hospitals, and hence any merger between these hospitals would not restrain competition."
The Elzinga-Hogarty test was a well-used crutch to support the case for merging hospitals in the 1980s and 1990s but has fallen out of favor in the past two decades, Levine says. "The test was originally designed to deal with how much foreclosure of a market there is on exclusionary provisions," Levine says.
"The FTC said it should not be used to define a relevant market because it only focuses on static measures and not on dynamic pressures. Even Prof. (Kenneth) Elzinga said no one should be using his test for those purposes."
Levine says he doesn't see a ripple effect with the ruling. "To the extent that your best argument is patient flow, it probably tells you you've got some issues," he says.
"At the end of the day, we all know how the FTC evaluates these mergers and most of the courts that have evaluated these mergers have evaluated it in that context. This case was a little bit sui generis in that it harkened back to the old days."
A quality program at UNC Hospitals empowers non-physician clinicians to activate response teams for cardiology inpatients using triage protocols used by first responders.
UNC Hospitals physicians say initial results midway through an inpatient STEMI (ST elevation myocardial infarction) identification and treatment pilot project show response times have been cut by 72%.
George A. Stouffer, MD, chief of cardiology at UNC Hospitals, says the in-house initiative at the Chapel Hill-based health system began after clinicians noted a high mortality rate among non-cardiac inpatients suffering from STEMI.
"We initially did a study looking at our patients here at UNC. We did a subsequent study using a California database and found it was a problem in hospitals there and presumably nationwide," says Stouffer, who published a research letter on his study this month in JAMA Cardiology.
"We put in place a quality improvement program at UNC to see if we could improve the times, and that was one of the reasons that patients were dying at a high rate—the delayed recognition and treatment," Stouffer says.
Nationwide, Stouffer estimates that there are approximately 11,000 cases of STEMI each year among hospital inpatients, and about 4,300 deaths in this group. He says STEMI is difficult to detect, especially for inpatients, because they often don't present with the "classic heart attack symptoms."
Rapid Identification
The initiative borrows techniques from emergency first-responders, which includes a quick diagnosis with an EKG and alerting the cardiac catheterization lab. It empowers nurses and other non-physician clinicians to initiate a rapid response team if STEMI is suspected.
"For someone in the hospital, say they've had a knee replacement or some other surgery or they're in with pneumonia, they present differently," he says. "Often, they get short of breath, but they often don't have typical symptoms and they are not able to convey that as easily to the doctors."
"The most common symptom is the patient is short of breath. Also the blood pressure falls, the patient gets confused, the heart rate monitor goes up or down," he says.
Empowered Nurses Are Key
All of these symptoms may have been noticed, "but the thinking was not necessarily that they are having a STEMI. We have done education at UNC so that that thought does go into the mind of the nurse so they can activate this cardiac response team. Within five minutes we will know, based on the EKG, whether that is the cause or not."
So far, the project has reduced response times from 483 minutes to 136 minutes. The pilot project has expanded to include 17 hospitals across the nation, and Stouffer says he hopes to have definitive data to support the efficacy of the program within three years.
Stouffer says the initiative was fairly simple to implement at UNC in large part because it relies on enlightenment and empowerment.
"A lot of this depends upon nurses in the hospitals, and nurses in non-cardiac services have watched their patients struggle for hours before a diagnosis was made," he says. "They were very interested in expediting this."
An analysis of claims data finds that health centers save, on average, $2,371 in total spending per Medicaid patient when compared to other providers.
A sweeping multistate study led by University of Chicago researchers validates what many public health advocates have known for years: Community Health Centers are a tremendous value.
The study, which will appear in the November issue of American Journal of Public Health, analyzed Medicaid claims data from 13 states for health center and non-health center patients, and found that health centers save, on average, $2,371 (or 24%) in total spending per Medicaid patient when compared to other providers.
The savings came primarily from lower utilization and spending across key drivers of healthcare costs, including:;
22% fewer hospital visits
33% lower spending on specialty care
25% fewer hospital admissions
27% lower spending on inpatient care
24% lower total spending
Dan Hawkins, senior vice president for Policy and Research at the National Association of Community Health Centers, calls the study "absolute validation of not only our own sentiment and belief in the value and effectiveness of health centers, but also a validation of studies done earlier using older Medicaid data, and studies going all the way back to the 1970s."
"This is the most recent, and it's the most comprehensive study; [comprising from] 13 states more than one million Medicaid beneficiaries' data claims," Hawkins says.
"It's not our data. It's Medicaid data from the states and (the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services) and it affirms the fact that health center care leads to lower use and lower spending in all the important factors: inpatient hospital, emergency room, and specialty care that drive total spending in areas generally for both public and private payers."
3 Influencing Factors
Hawkins credits much of the savings generated by the 1,300 community health centers across the nation to three factors:
1. Nonprofit Status
"No. 1, they are nonprofit organizations, all of them," he says. "They are not out to make a fast buck. That is not to say that every other provider is out to make a fast buck, but there are some out there and that is part of what drives spending, for sure."
2. An Extremely Low-Income Population
"No. 2, the people they serve are low-income in the extreme; 93% have incomes below twice the federal poverty level," he says. "Even for those among them who have coverage, the coverage is typically Medicaid. It is exceedingly difficult to get a low-income patient an appointment with a specialist, and it requires that it be done by the health centers only when they desperately need that care."
"Then, the health center physicians will go into beast mode and do what they have to do to get the care for these folks. But they don't just willy-nilly send the patients out for an MRI or a consult when the patient needs it. They are not into overuse because they can't afford it."
3. A History of Quality Improvement
"Finally, there is a long history of health centers being focused on quality improvement," he says. "A significant number of health centers today are primary care medical homes. Many have been certified as quality of care leaders. This is something that health centers aspire to."
"They understand that simply because they see low-income and difficult-to-serve people they might be considered less-than-stellar providers in their own right. The 12,000 physicians and thousands of other clinicians who work at health centers do not want to be considered second class so they strive to do the best they can."
With a growing body of evidence showing that health centers work, Hawkins says the next push will be to double, from 25 million to 50 million, the number of people served each year over the next decade by community health centers.
"There are still more than 50 million Americans today, this according to the National Center for Health Statistics, who don't have a source for primary care, other than the emergency room, where they go sporadically," he says.
"Health centers want to be that source of care for those individuals because they are the patients who drive up spending by delaying care until it's costly."
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has all but declared war on readmissions. But one researcher suggests that the relationship between readmission rates and quality is flawed.
Researchers and physicians at The Johns Hopkins Hospital are challenging the notion that readmissions are an accurate measure of quality.
In a study this month in Journal of Hospital Medicine, hospitalist Daniel J. Brotman, MD, and his colleagues examined nearly 4,500 acute-care hospitals' hospital-wide readmission rates and compared them with those hospitals' mortality rates in six areas used by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: heart attack, pneumonia, heart failure, stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and coronary artery bypass.
The researchers found that hospitals with the highest rates of readmission were more likely to show better mortality scores in patients treated for heart failure, COPD, and stroke.
Adjusted odds ratios indicated that patients treated at hospitals that had more readmitted patients had a fractionally better chance at survival than patients who were cared for at hospitals with lower readmission rates.
Brotman spoke with HealthLeaders Media about the findings. The following is an edited transcript.
HLM: What prompted you to raise questions about readmissions as a quality metric?
Brotman: We've been involved at Johns Hopkins Hospital with a number of readmission initiatives and we have tried to reduce readmission rates using a lot of the interventions published in the medical literature. We were struck by the difficulty of reducing readmissions in outpatient populations.
When we did deep dives into causes of readmissions for individual patients, sometimes we saw situations in which providing more comprehensive, detailed, or sophisticated care was leading to readmissions. The defects that lead to readmissions are usually not related to the care provided during the hospitalization.
We were particularly alarmed to see that CMS Star Ratings rated readmissions similarly to mortality. That raised a question: Are readmissions really a quality metric? Certainly readmissions are a measure of how much care a patient is getting in the inpatient setting to some extent, but are they a measure of quality or do they measure something else?
HLM: You talk about "unintended consequences" with the readmissions metric. Please elaborate.
Brotman: One of the ways to prevent a readmission is to keep someone out of the hospital at all costs. That is not necessarily good for patient care. With increasing financial pressures to reduce readmissions, there are going to be unintended consequences.
We thought it would be worthwhile to ask if readmission rates at the hospital level and mortality rates at the hospital track. If hospitals that attempt to have better mortality rates also tend to have lower readmission rates, that would lend credence to the notion that readmission measures are one measure of quality of care that track with other measures of quality care, such as mortality.
In fact, we saw the opposite.
It wasn't a relationship that was so strong to say that people should flee from hospitals with low readmissions rates because their patients are more likely to die. Correlation does not always mean causation.
But it raises the question as to whether these all-cause readmission rates are a valid measure of quality. The purpose of the study was to shine a light on that and make sure we are not assuming that hospital readmission rates are truly a measure of quality. They are a measure of a lot of factors and quality can be one of them, but it is not a dominant factor.
HLM: What caveats would you attach to make readmissions a better metric?
Brotman: It's hard to make it a proper metric because for most patients who get readmitted, and this has been validated by others, the readmission isn't preventable by things that could have been done differently by the hospital or the discharging provider.
Most readmissions are either a function of the patient's illness, or a function of the patient's quality of outpatient care, or a function of the patient's engagement and follow through. Most are not due to defects in care.
The benefit of looking at readmissions is in making sure that you're addressing the particular care defects that might lead to readmissions. Doing root cause analyses on readmissions that you know are preventable can be a useful enterprise to identify system defects. But, you have to look at actual care defects.
CMS is hoping to use administrative data without having to do a deep dive on individual patient charts to calculate this metric. This is an experiment that is failing. It is not a proven quality and I want that discussion to be out there.
HLM: What are the practical effects of this misapplied readmissions metric on patient care?
Brotman: In the aggregate, it probably is helping patient care to focus somewhat on readmissions, in that it helps institutions pay attention to potential care defects and to use the episode of care as part of a continuum rather than once the patient is out of the hospital you can be done with it.
There shouldn't be an incentive to deliver sloppy care, and when the patient gets readmitted you get paid again.
Readmissions, like length of stay, should be a utilization measure, not a quality measure. There are some readmissions that are good. There are some readmissions that are bad. If you shorten length of stay with a bad diagnosis and send the patient out prematurely or kick someone out of the hospital who doesn't have a safe disposition plan, that is not short length of stay for a good reason.
By the same token, if you are restricting patients from accessing acute care hospitals because you are trying to keep your readmissions rates down, that is not good for patients.
I don't fundamentally have a problem with CMS trying to get hospitals to lower their readmissions or general admissions rates. We shouldn't admit patients who don't really need to be in the hospital.
But we also shouldn't be incentivizing hospitals to do their best to turn away patients who do need hospitalization regardless of whether they've recently been hospitalized.
HLM: Your study linked lower mortality rates with higher readmissions. How big of a factor was that difference?
Brotman: We are talking at the hospital level analysis. You wouldn't tell a patient "Hey, if you get readmitted you are less likely to die." That would be a misinterpretation of our data. What we are saying is that there is a small but significant association between good mortality rates as defined by the measures used by CMS and high readmissions as defined by CMS at the hospital level.
It does demonstrate that these measures do not correlate in tandem the way you might expect to see and there is a reason for that, which is that readmissions are not a quality measure.
HLM: How should readmissions be used in the Five Star Ratings?
Brotman: If they were constructed to look at avoidable readmissions where process of care and readmissions were coupled, that would be a valid quality measure. But if we are not tracking process of care, they have no role in quality measure assessment. They should not be in the Five-Star Rating.
However, they can potentially be a target for reimbursement, as with length of stay. If you have a high readmission rate, you are using more services and as a society we need to be circumspect about the resources we are using.
It shouldn't be a double whammy though, where not only are you having some financial impact for having high readmissions rates, but also a reputational impact as it is a measure of quality. It is a measure of utilization and not a measure of quality.