Healthcare organizations can lower readmissions and improve patient care significantly through a simple move that doesn't involve fancy data systems or expensive care coordinators, according to new research. If your organization doesn't use an oral nutritional supplement protocol, why not?
New research suggests healthcare organizations can lower readmissions and improve patient care significantly, and it doesn't involve fancy data systems or expensive care coordinators. In fact, it may come in a bottle or can.
That's because a recent study by researchers at the University of Southern California, Stanford University, The Harris School at The University of Chicago, and Precision Health Economics finds that hospitals and health systems could conceivably reduce readmissions for Medicare patients by 8.4% and significantly reduce length of stay simply by incorporating oral nutritional supplements into care protocols for hospital stays.
One reason doing so works so well, says Julia Thornton Snider, PhD, a research economist with Precision Health Economics, is that other studies suggest that as many as 50% of patients are clinically malnourished after discharge.
"We have defined malnutrition through advanced nutrition statistics," she says. "It's the frail person you think of, but it also includes those who could also technically be obese."
The six clinical characteristics of malnutrition, as defined in 2012 by the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics and the American Society of Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition, are:
Insufficient food and nutrition intake compared with nutrition requirements
Weight loss over time
Loss of muscle mass
Loss of fat mass
Fluid accumulation
Measurably diminished grip strength
A patient who exhibits any two of the six characteristics should be diagnosed with malnutrition, the groups say.
Kelly Tappenden, PhD, of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics and its representative to the Alliance to Advance Patient Nutrition, says the Joint Commission mandates a nutrition screening within 24 hours of admission. Yet the screening is often not completed or the results may not flag timely follow-up before a patient is discharged.
"Additionally, priority is put on addressing high-acuity patient health needs," says Tappenden, who is Professor of Nutrition and Gastrointestinal Physiology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. "As a therapy, nutrition is often overlooked and undervalued in the hospital setting." She adds that one in three patients enter the hospital malnourished.
"The good news is that as the body of science supporting nutrition is advancing, we are seeing hospital administrators and interdisciplinary clinician teams take notice of the benefits of nutrition on patient outcomes," she says.
Snider was the project leader on the study, which came about after an earlier study found strong benefits to providing oral nutrition supplements to the general inpatient population.
"That [study] basically looked at the general inpatient population and found that providing oral nutrition supplements had impressive benefits on reduced readmissions and reduced length of stay. But while it's interesting in the general patient population, hospitals don't see a general patient. They see someone with a specific diagnosis or diagnoses. They wanted to know who to apply it to," Snider says.
Now they have at least a partial answer.
The newer study, presented last week at the Society for Medical Decision Making meeting in Baltimore, showed that providing oral nutritional supplements was associated with the decreased probability of 30-day readmission among Medicare patients. The study further breaks down results from that population based on diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia, which are among the diagnoses CMS penalizes hospitals for based on 30-day readmission rates.
The results are compelling. Among them:
An 8.4% reduction for patients with any diagnosis
A 10.1% reduction for congestive heart failure patients
A 12% reduction for acute myocardial infarction patients
Given the penalties that are accruing for hospitals and health systems for 30-day readmissions, those results should get your attention. But if that's not enough, the study also found that the use of oral nutritional supplements delivered improvements in patient length of stay and hospital costs. Oral nutritional supplements were even more impactful and statistically significant on length of stay and cost of care when looking at all Medicare patients aged 65 and older with any primary diagnosis:
16%, or 1.65 days, reduction in length of stay
15.8%, or $3,079, in cost savings per episode
The study looked at 11 years of hospital data (2000–2010) on hospitalized Medicare patients aged 65 and over with any diagnosis, as well as breakouts for patients with AMI, CHF, and pneumonia.
These results are impressive enough, and the cost of implementing an oral nutrition program so minimal compared to other interventions that aim to reduce readmissions, that I'm amazed more CEOs don't demand that it be included in their hospital stay care protocols—not only for Medicare patients but for all inpatients. According to Snider, only 1.6% of patients in the study were provided oral nutritional supplements during and after their stay. Given the findings, which admittedly cover a long time period during which less was known about this issue, I would expect that percentage to rise dramatically in coming years. So be cynical based on the study's funding at your peril.
"Overall, there needs to be a cultural shift where nutrition is valued through interdisciplinary collaboration," says Tappenden. "Probably one of the most important changes hospital administrators can make is to provide nutrition-related ordering privileges to registered dietitians, rather than it being the responsibility of the physicians on staff."
She also says that as hospitals increasingly move to EHRs, it is critical to incorporate malnutrition screening and criteria, with automated triggers for the registered dietitians, and to incorporate nutrition into discharge planning and patient education.
If you're interested in improving nutritional screening and nutrition among your patient population, help is available. In June, the Alliance to Advance Patient Nutrition released its nutrition care recommendations, which outline six principles to help transform nutrition practices in hospitals nationwide.
"I think the evidence is compelling and it's a call to action for a lot of reasons—one being the new [CMS] penalties," says Snider. "But ultimately people come to their jobs in healthcare to help people get better, and in this case it's a win-win."
Patients are already facing copays, coinsurance, and deductibles that are much higher than only a year or two ago. If you think they're unhappy now, wait until you see what happens when you try to collect their share of your payment directly.
New headlines this month have focused on how difficult, if not impossible, it is to shop for health insurance through healthcare.gov, the online clearinghouse for the uninsured who want to sign up for Obamacare.
Those problems will eventually get fixed, and if I know the government, the solution will involve throwing gobs of money.
But let's think forward for a moment. Regardless of how the drama of the health insurance exchanges' operability plays out, eventually a lot of people who didn't have insurance before will gain it. One potential problem: the quality of that insurance shows every sign of declining across the patient population.
If your life depends on getting paid in full for your work, and most hospitals' lives do depend on it, that task will get much more difficult.
While it's good that many people who once were uninsured will now be covered, what is the quality of that coverage from a collectability standpoint? Many, if not most, who sign up through the exchanges will be choosing the cheapest plan available, known as the bronze plan.
It remains to be seen how many "healthy" people will sign up. And even those who are fortunate enough to hang onto their employer-provided health insurance plans may find out that their plans are little more than bronze as well. This is part of a recent trend with employer-based plans, where patients are already facing copays, coinsurance, and deductibles that are much higher than they were only a year or two ago.
If you can't collect the patient's share of payment effectively, you're in trouble.
That puts hospitals, the place where care is most expensive, in a difficult position. If they want to be fully paid for their work, and if they want to fulfill their contracts with health insurers, hospitals are required to collect these growing amounts of cash directly from patients.
They've been getting better at it, but a side effect of this change they haven't counted on until recently is a level of hatred, and at least as importantly, payment resistance, from patients.
I use the strong word "hatred" because when I was talking to a CFO about this problem in August at the HealthLeaders CFO Exchange in Colorado, he used that word when we talked about his organization's efforts to collect the patient's share of hospital payment.
To be sure, the trend of greater patient financial responsibility for their healthcare is not necessarily driven by Obamacare. In fact, it's chiefly driven by the fact that health insurance deductibles, coinsurance, and copays have been seen by employers and payers for a few years now as the last best hope to get a handle on the growth in healthcare costs.
The theory is that patients will begin to ration their healthcare and shop for the best price because they're more responsible for the cost. Well, that may happen, but other negative consequences of this trend are less immediately apparent. Sometimes, they just can't, or won't pay.
One consequence, this CFO argued, is that patients begin to blame the hospital for the crushing level of healthcare costs for which they are now responsible. This makes them less likely to pay than ever.
In any case, the CFO and several of his colleagues agreed that hospitals will likely be the focal point of hatred from patients simply because they're trying to collect on a bill that used to be paid by someone else.
In most cases, patients find out about the huge share of the cost of care they are responsible for from the hospitals themselves. So it's at least partially a case of 'blame the messenger.'
Patients have signed their benefit forms, and they've signed up for insurance, but little do they know that they've gone from a $500 deductible to a $5,000 one. All of a sudden, a trip to the hospital and they have to come up with thousands of dollars to pay the bill. And they haven't budgeted for it.
Many hospitals are already suffering from huge bad debt burdens. Hospitals are at the end of the chain; they're the ones trying to collect the balance, and they have to explain to the patient why that is. It's not an easy conversation. And woe to the hospital that can't collect the patient's portion of the bill prior to service. It's certainly not easy to collect it after.
What hospitals are really left telling many patients is that they have poor insurance. Their coverage is little more than a catastrophic plan. Much of the rest is up to your patients and their employers, who are stuck with skyrocketing rates for that catastrophic coverage.
They're in for a rude awakening, and it's not your fault. But they'll be blaming you.
The author of a study on pay for performance in healthcare, says there is little evidence to support that incentives for following certain processes that have been proven to add value… actually improve quality or value.
Payers have for years tried to impart a sense of accountability to healthcare providers through financial incentives, yet inefficiency and poor outcomes still plague the healthcare system.
The way the majority of healthcare is paid for is a chief culprit. Fee-for-service healthcare provides virtually no incentive for coordination of care and perversely rewards waste.
This is not a new problem, but it defies easy solutions.
Payers have tried to imparting some performance expectations and measurement tools into healthcare payment through so-called pay for performance programs that offer incentives for following certain processes that have been proven to add value, and they should make a difference, as logic dictates.
The problem, says the author of a study on pay for performance, is that this kind of logic may not apply in healthcare, at least not at the levels currently in place.
One of the more widely used tools in a thin toolbox that payers use to modify behavior among service providers has been so-called P4P incentives. Insurers have relied on them for years to better coordinate care, eliminate waste and improve processes. But do they work?
We don't really know, says the study's author. While there's widespread evidence that providers do respond to such incentives, says Andrew Ryan, an associate professor of public health with the Weill Cornell Medical School, there's little evidence that such incentives actually improve quality or value, which are, after all, the goals.
P4P Shortcomings
And although P4P seems to make common sense, and P4P based programs are now widely used by both CMS and commercial payers, Ryan says one shortcoming is that they're probably too limited in scope and in scale.
"One of the problems with the programs that have been implemented to date is that incentives aren't high-powered," says Ryan. "P4P represents less than 1% of revenue for providers in some cases."
An analogy would go something like this: Two competitors are hired to build a fence. A high-quality fence would bring Competitor A $100, and a low quality one that built by Competitor B would bring him $99. The cheaper fence could be the worst fence in the world, and fall down tomorrow, but as long as it was standing today, Competitor B would be paid the agreed-upon $99. Competitor A might build the best fence ever and still been paid $100.
What incentive does Competitor B have to improve? Not much. What incentive does he have to continue to labor intensively for his high quality fence? Again, not much.
If it now seems ridiculous that providers would make the sorts of investments that would help them improve quality and attain such meager bonuses, it is, Ryan says.
P4P Incentives Too Small Another problem is if the incentives need to be larger, where is the money going to come from? Very few commercial insurers want to add new money so that means moving away from bonuses. After all, the larger goal is to reduce the cost growth of healthcare. New bonus money has to come from somewhere. Meanwhile, Medicare is trying to do incentives that are budget-neutral, Ryan says.
"The problem here is if we went to 5% or 10% [of revenues], that would get attention, but risk disadvantaging certain types of providers like the safety net. Some could get penalized a lot," he says. "It's a classic trade-off and I'm not sure what the sweet spot is as to the level of incentive anyway."
Another problem with getting traction from P4P on improving value is that such programs focus on process measures instead of outcomes, Ryan says. But measuring outcomes presents its own set of complications, which is one reason why P4P still gets so much attention.
"Providers often don't like outcomes because they argue they are largely out of their control," he says, adding that performance on outcomes measures is quite noisy statistically, "so you might have a rate that looks good one year and bad the next and is a result of statistical noise. There's not much of a quality signal there."
The other problem, of course, is that incentivizing outcomes also creates incentives to avoid providing care for certain types of patients.
"We have risk adjustment, and if it was perfect, we wouldn't have people contending reimbursement on outcomes is unfair, but it's not and never will be," says Ryan.
There is a move toward using outcomes more in determining reimbursement levels, which is what's happening in the Medicare programs.
"On the hospital side in the first year, incentives were just for process measures and patient experience. In the second year, outcomes will be incentivized, so over time, process measures will get less weight and outcomes will get more," says Ryan. "It will be interesting to see once we start to emphasize action on improving outcomes whether we see those unintended consequences."
Such incentives have a mixed record at best of obtaining the type of care coordination and handoff work desired by both payers and patients. Ryan says health policy for decades has tried to influence payers and providers to replicate Kaiser, a fully integrated system with both a payer and provider component under one roof. That way, he says, incentives are aligned for low costs, efficient care and high quality. Since the Clinton health plan and managed care both collapsed due to a variety of factors unrelated to healthcare transactions, he says P4P has filled the vacuum as something that could be done to influence quality on the margin.
"But the results have certainly not been transformative," he says. "We're at a place where there's almost complete recognition we need to move away from fee-for-service somehow, so we have ACOs, P4P, and CMS experimenting with bundled payment models to pay prospectively rather than retrospectively."
None of those alone has the blueprint to better, cheaper care, he says, adding that messing around at the margins is not likely to bring success.
"Providers want to be ahead of the curve, and participate in these new payment models to get some learning experience so they'll be ready, but it's not clear that these models are in their best interest to participate in," he says.
Wanted: A More Cooperative Relationship with Payers "Anything that's entirely voluntary won't get much momentum, and ultimately, if it's not in providers' financial interest, they'll stop participating." P4P programs are a poor motivator not only because they are limited in revenue scope, but also because they have been seen by insurers as the best they could do to influence providers to improve, he says.
"That's the reason why they're doing this," he says. "Something must be done. This is something, therefore this must be done," he jokes. "Other valid reforms are more challenging."
Ryan advocates a more cooperative relationship with payers, which includes intensive technical assistance, coaching, and learning collaboratives.
"The easiest thing for payers to do is to change how they pay, so we have this generation of P4P programs," he says. "It's hard to argue with the concept but there are so many ways it can fail, so there's some opportunity cost for policymakers and payers."
Ryan says the cost of doing less than optimal programs to improve quality is that they take away momentum and enthusiasm for programs that might be more beneficial.
"I wouldn't say we should abandon P4P, but we should think about these tradeoffs."
There's ample disagreement about how much control hospitals can exercise over readmission rates. Farsighted leaders are taking on a big endeavor by focusing on all-cause readmissions.
This article appears in the October issue of HealthLeaders magazine.
Hospital leaders have long known that they would be at risk for penalties from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services based on how well they prevent 30-day readmissions for three targeted diagnoses. But that amount of lead time may not have been enough: More than 2,000 hospitals faced penalties in the 2013 fiscal year based on discharges between July 1, 2008, and June 30, 2011.
Still, no matter how badly they missed, hospital penalties for FY 2013 were capped at 1% of Medicare reimbursements. But that cap ratcheted up to 2% for FY 2014 and 3% for FY 2015. Besides that, the number of conditions and diagnoses at risk also are likely to increase dramatically.
There's ample disagreement about how much control hospitals can exercise over readmission rates, or whether readmissions rates are indicators of quality patient care. Regardless, that is a political debate that has already been fought on the Medicare side, and commercial payers are likely to follow suit. The rule is the rule, and it's left to hospital leaders to figure out how best to reduce readmissions such that quality patient care and the metric are both best served, if that's possible.
Looking at all causes
In terms of strategy, what's the best way to approach this large and growing risk of reduced revenues? Not necessarily by targeting the conditions CMS has highlighted for penalties, say those who have had success in reducing readmissions. The debate centers over whether hospitals and health systems should target the three diagnoses—heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia—that are guaranteed to provide an immediate return on investment by avoiding penalties or instead focus on so-called all-cause readmissions, says Laura Jacquin, managing director at Huron Consulting Group, a Chicago-based consulting firm.
"What we feel is best practice is to consider all-cause because it reflects better preparation for the future and knowing that, in true CMS fashion, we can expect more diagnoses to be added," she says.
Still, it's a big endeavor to attack readmissions for all causes. Therefore, it may be easier to manage by staging your system's interventions by focusing on certain diagnoses as pilots with the goal of expansion, says Jacquin.
Regardless of the approach, one of the most important decisions that can be made is to ensure there's a standard method to how the organization is treating all patient populations. That's where WellStar Health System, a five-hospital, 1,321-licensed-bed system based in Marietta, Ga., chose to begin six years ago.
Reynold Jennings, WellStar's president and CEO, says what makes implementing a readmissions strategy so complicated is that there's no single reason anyone gets readmitted to the hospital, so it's an imperfect metric of quality care to begin with. But the holistic approach works better because all facets of care delivery have an impact on readmissions.
Focusing on just the three diagnoses that may generate penalties is shortsighted and may be counterproductive in the long run. That's why so many CEOs these days boil down their strategy to reduce avoidable readmissions to "doing what's right for the patient," as Jennings says. That's a frustratingly simple answer to a very difficult question, and "doing what's right" can mean spending lots of capital and staff time on things that may not yield a definable return on investment.
Jennings says WellStar, which also owns ambulatory, primary care, imaging, and other therapeutics, was able to get to a viable readmissions strategy that is scalable through its medical home program.
"The 3%–5% of the sickest patients who have three or more chronic illnesses consume at least 30% of all healthcare dollars and maybe as much as 50%," he says.
So it makes sense to focus on that group of chronically ill patients. Studies have shown that many such patients get readmitted due to environmental factors beyond the health system's control, such as compromised financial means, mental health problems, or lack of a strong family support system. Jennings thinks, however, that about half of the system's patients don't have those additional risk factors, and thus are a good place to start.
"There's nothing a hospital can do to take care of thousands of patients who fall into that first category, but the other half of readmissions is due to poor chronic medical management," he says. "Originally, most of the literature focused on the primary care physician's office, but without specialty physicians and their teams aligned with the primary care doc, you can't get to medical home management on an outpatient basis."
What WellStar is doing to intervene with patients for whom it can make a difference on readmissions is an approach that has already paid dividends, Jennings says.
"I personally don't think most hospitals are implementing a proactive strategy," he says.
Based on published readmission rates, he says an 8% readmission rate for all causes is the best case, while 14% is the midpoint. WellStar is at 8%.
"The hospitals in the higher range have a less synchronized and less coordinated medical staff leadership structure," he says. "Therefore, care is delivered in a silo fashion without regard to the patient as a whole. How we got down to 8% is we got into clinical service line management."
WellStar expanded its clinical service line management from seven departments to 11 over the years, and includes both its employed and its independent physicians on clinical service line councils, on which more than 100 physicians, both independent and employed, serve. Those councils meet and figure out how physicians can and should collaborate on the sickest patients.
Further, under an accountable care organization, the health system can redistribute dollars to allow primary care physicians to spend time they need on, for example, predictive modeling, care managers, and call centers for medication management.
"Quality of care to the patient represents the keys to the kingdom," says Jennings. "You'll cut some revenue if you tackle all-cause, but if you go after the easy-to-solve issues on readmissions, you won't always get there. That's why we got into Medicare Shared Savings: We saw the wisdom of attacking all spectrums simultaneously."
Risk stratification
One of the key strategies that healthcare organizations should consider to get to the best practice of all-cause readmissions prevention is to look at ways they can identify patients who might be at higher risk of readmissions, as WellStar has begun to do, says Huron's Jacquin.
"More clinically integrated systems can accomplish this better, and that's an opportunity for some revenue," she says. "But the bottom line is, it's not something you can turn on overnight."
She also says such leaders recognize that doing medical management work with an eye toward reducing readmissions is going to impact revenue negatively, but it's the right thing to do and will pay off in the long run as penalties are increased and diagnoses added.
"At this point, there's not really much you can do to limit the revenue impact," she says. "And besides, CMS won't sit still."
Leaders need to develop different tools and different approaches for high-risk, moderate-risk, and low-risk patients, but most important, they must identify such patients.
"Building these things anticipating all-cause means it won't be quite as difficult later," she says.
Montefiore Medical Center in New York City's Bronx borough has a long history of taking risk with its patients. Anne Meara, RN, MBA, is associate vice president of network care management for CMO, Montefiore Care Management, a healthcare management company that works with a network of more than 3,400 physicians and ancillary providers who provide care to more than 225,000 individuals covered by a variety of government-sponsored and private sector health insurance programs. She says focusing on readmissions only is likely to be less effective than working to eliminate system breakdowns and improving chronic care management.
Hospitals, from a leadership standpoint, are often lured into focusing on the readmission and not the factors that led to it in the first place. So it's not that targeting can't work, but that it's very short-term and not sustainable. In fact, Meara says focusing on readmissions at all leaves out all the interventions that can be made to a patient's care along the way. The readmission represents the culmination of all that effort, or lack of it.
"Focusing on the readmissions is focusing on the far end of the continuum," she says. "Particularly with preventable readmissions, there are systems breakdowns along the way—some related to things in control of the healthcare provider and some not so much. We're focused on many stops along the way and moving preventive care and chronic care management further upstream in the continuum."
Meara says Montefiore's efforts to reduce readmissions critically involves partners outside the health system because patients in the area access many different healthcare providers that aren't necessarily owned or controlled by the health system. In partnerships with local payers and other healthcare providers, including other hospitals, Montefiore has implemented extensive interventions geared toward helping avoid readmissions in all stratifications, even among patients who may have psychosocial issues or transportation problems. They scale up interventions based on risk factors.
"These are not high-tech interventions, but they are resource-intensive," she says. "Many hospitals are engaged in post follow-up phone call programs. The difference with this is, we stayed involved."
Other hospitals may stop intervening after the postdischarge follow-up call, for example, and they often don't go beyond checking on prescription-filling and adherence. The care transition managers involved in the Bronx Collaborative—which includes three hospitals: Montefiore, St. Barnabas Hospital, Bronx-Lebanon, and two payers: EmblemHealth and Health First—not only search to identify challenges surrounding patients likely to be readmitted, but also are coached to intervene.
Results bear out the return on this increased level of intervention. Among 500 patients who received two or more "interventions" in the Bronx Collaborative to manage the transition between hospital and home, only 17.6% were readmitted to the hospital within 60 days of discharge versus 26.3% among a comparison group of 190 patients who received the current standard of care. When the other 85 patients who received only one intervention for a variety of reasons are included in the results, there was a higher readmission rate, at 22.8%, but still lower than the standard.
"That's where it's difficult for hospitals—where the savings are not accruing to them. That's the dilemma. The question was how do we move to the place where the way we are reimbursed works with this?"
Montefiore leadership makes a compelling case to local payers that using the same case manager who intervenes during hospitalization and follows up for 60 days postdischarge builds trust as well as, critically, compliance with postdischarge physician appointments and drug regimens. The case managers integrate such follow-up into what Meara calls "usual care" to enhance transitional planning processes.
"We have very strong working relationships with the two health plans involved," says Janet Kasoff, EdD, RN, the senior director of the Center for Learning and Innovation for CMO, Montefiore Care Management. "I'm really happy that those people did see this as an opportunity. In order to reduce readmissions, we need to work together."
As part of the discussions about readmission prevention with payers, the Bronx Collaborative was formed to improve healthcare in the Bronx, with the Care Transition program to combat high readmission rates at all three hospitals.
"Working together, we did craft a care transition fee such that we were paid for this work," Meara says. "That's a differentiator. Hospitals need to be looking to go down this path of contracting in different ways with payers, but who has? It's a huge challenge to make this kind of investment if there's not some share in the savings to be had."
That said, now is the time for hospitals to face up to going down that path with payers. Given the readmission penalties that are there now and those that are likely in the near future, sticking to business as usual is clearly not the right way to go.
"You need to be asking yourself, if I'm not part of an ACO, how can I partner? One of our partner hospitals is not going to be an ACO, but it will be a good partner in our ACO and I think that's the pathway," says Meara.
"The ability to demonstrate that hospitals and payer organizations can work collaboratively toward a goal and establish standards and processes across organizations that sort of collaboration has much broader implications," Meara says. "We can't only rely on ourselves to be successful."
Reprint HLR1013-4
This article appears in the October issue of HealthLeaders magazine.
The traditional hospital has become not only a high-cost boogeyman, but also a sign of the limits of a CEO's leadership capabilities. Buttressing a financially vulnerable hospital's business with ancillary services is one way CEOs are being innovative. Now other industry players need to catch up.
It used to be easier for reporters to cover hospitals.
There were hospitals—defined by providing inpatient care almost exclusively—and there was everything else. And never the twain should meet.
But the definition of what a hospital is has been getting blurrier and blurrier over the years.
Hospitals, increasingly, are a part of the whole. If they have not grown by branching out into other areas of greater opportunity in recent years, they've been absorbed by other organizations that have already made the transition into owning more and more pieces of the healthcare continuum, from rehab facilities and surgery centers to health clubs and even hospice.
The hospital has become not only the high-cost boogeyman, but also a sign of the limits of your capabilities. No organization wants to be known as "X Hospital" anymore. At least on a corporate level, it's "Health" or "Healthcare," which is thought to connote the idea that these organizations are not just for acute services anymore—they are the soup-to-nuts answer for your healthcare needs.
Frankly, that's a welcome change, as long as health systems don't unfairly dominate one market such that it has de facto control over reimbursement rates in a given area. It reflects an acknowledgement by hospital and health system boards and senior leaders that in order to make the most of the transformation of the healthcare business model from volume to value, systems must influence and even control how patients move through the entire healthcare system, such as it is, not just through an acute phase of care.
Much of this transformation is understandable. For years, many have been pushing hospitals to be more cooperative with other sites of care. But that's been a hard sell. Regardless of how you feel about coordination of care, hospitals for too long decided that if it happened outside their four walls, it wasn't their responsibility.
And after all, why should it have been? The way they were paid certainly didn't encourage coordination, and patient outcomes were not part of any payment equation. But now that's changing, and no one wants to be known simply as a "hospital" anymore.
If you want to create an ACO, which, let's face it, whether substantive or not, is the way to show the world that you are truly focused on the continuum of care, you need all these pieces and parts. And you need innovative leaders to run them. Sure, you can create effective care transitions without owning the pieces, but it's more complex, and the last thing most healthcare leaders want is more complexity on their daily calendars.
However, successfully integrating such pieces of the continuum doesn't stop at acquisition, of course. Many who began their careers in hospitals and stayed there have little experience in managing these other lines of business. That adds to the fear that the capital required to re-engineer the business model may yet still be squandered.
First among CEOs' concerns has to be the fact that healthcare leaders need new faces, new skill sets, and new ideas on the system's leadership team. Managing a physician practice or outpatient surgery center requires a basket of skills and experience that most hospitals and health systems don't have.
Sometimes they make the mistake of pretending that such entities can be managed by those who grew up in hospitals. Usually, this is not the case, even if the misalignment comes more from a political and cultural place than in actual aptitude.
So CEOs are hiring executives from health plans to help manage risk. They're hiring physician executives to help re-engineer care, and they're employing a cast of people who can help patients manage through care transitions. That's effectively what all these experimental risk-based payment systems have been asking them to do.
Which brings us to the second main concern of CEOs: The payment system has an even longer way to go toward truly paying for patient outcomes, even if hospitals and health systems are scrambling to put the pieces of the new business model together, often at great expense.
Pay-for-performance schemes have been around for years, especially from commercial payers, but they have been crude, largely experimental, and not robust or expansive enough to truly influence behavior change among providers. CMS has also made strides, but the fact remains that only a small percentage of healthcare reimbursement is at risk currently, and the number will remain small in at least the medium-term future.
Hospitals and health systems have long been criticized as bastions of the status quo, when the status quo is playing a big part in bankrupting the country.
Now, as many recent conversations and events have proven to me, hospitals and health systems being innovative by accumulating expertise and pieces of the healthcare system that they never much cared about in the past, on the promise or threat, depending on your point of view, that payments will move toward value and away from fee-for-service.
Now, it seems, it's the rest of the world that needs to catch up.
The volume of healthcare mergers and acquisitions lately has been stunning. But to some hospital and health system executives, it's nothing compared to what's coming over the next decade.
This article appears in the October issue of HealthLeaders magazine.
In fact, Cleveland Clinic President and CEO Delos "Toby" Cosgrove, MD, boldly predicts that what he calls a "big dozen" integrated regional systems will come to dominate the healthcare industry. While this consolidation is "a long way away" from completion, he says, independents will continue to disappear—a trend that will pick up speed as time goes on—thanks to declining reimbursement, lack of capital access, and their inherent inefficiency compared to integrated systems.If many of the most influential health system leaders are to be believed, independent hospitals are a dying breed, and small systems might be right behind them on the endangered list. The United States has around 5,700 hospitals, according to the American Hospital Association, and already more than half of them (slightly more than 3,000) belong to systems. Expect that trend not only to continue but to accelerate, industry leaders say.
What's more, Cosgrove says, the drivers of consolidation have changed. While the healthcare industry has gone through M&A waves before, this time around consolidation isn't a play for market dominance. For one thing, government regulators are watching closely and often are breaking up even completed mergers that they deem have local or regional monopoly at heart more than operating efficiencies. Instead, today's mergers and affiliations are more a reflection of several factors that are making independent hospitals, and, in fact, comprehensive service hospitals of all kinds, functionally obsolete.
This trend is most visible as organizations formerly known as hospitals change their names to reflect "health system" or just "health" while eliminating the word "hospital." This change implies that instead of focusing on acute care, such organizations can provide a continuum of healthcare services. Whether the actual transformation of service offerings (typically incorporating primary care, rehab, and other services outside the acute care setting) is nascent or well in progress is another story.
The new dynamics of consolidation
Today, many systems of significant size are combining—or in some cases, trying and failing to combine. The dynamism around the acquisition and affiliation game has never been stronger. Unlike acquisitions of a different era, much of this activity is centered on linkages in disparate markets. In other words, it's not the traditional play to gain market share in a particular small area that is driving this trend.
Instead, the impetus stems from the increasing complexity of healthcare, the ability to drive efficiencies in the back office by leveraging technology, and the push to cut costs engineered by the federal government, employers, and health plans. It's also about reducing duplication of services—not just in small local areas—but in large regions.
The health plan sector, for example, has consolidated markedly over the past couple of decades. The top 25 health plans in terms of market share account for nearly two-thirds of total premium dollars, according to the most recent (2009) data from U.S. News & World Report and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. So why won't hospitals and health systems consolidate in a similar fashion?
They will, says Bill Thompson, who, as president and CEO of St. Louis–based SSM Health Care, recently inked a merger with Madison, Wis.–based Dean Health Systems, a physician-owned system that approved the merger with a 97% majority of its physicians voting for it. SSM had operating revenue of $3.3 billion in 2012.
Thompson says delivering value is the key metric for hospitals and health systems going forward, and that systems that want to grow and prosper need not only to lower their prices for care over time, but must also lower their internal cost structure so that they can compete with other low-cost interlopers like drugstore chains that will eat away at their margins through better and cheaper primary and chronic care management. In other words, hospitals and health systems in the future will have to compete on value and price through expanding the portfolio of businesses that health systems own or with which they affiliate or otherwise share risk, and also through economies of scale.
"We're looking for opportunities to lower our cost structure while we lower our price point. That will enable us to make a profit," he says. "The other economic pressure at work here is that the organization that continues to deliver value—that is, that manages its price point lower while improving quality—is typically rewarded in the marketplace by attracting more and more business. We're facing what other industries have been facing for years—particularly retail. The current environment is asking us to behave similarly."
He argues that's in part because the consumer of care—the patient—is less insulated from the cost impact of their decisions than in the past. While many patients are far from influencing what health services they consume, it's clear that the federal government and, to a lesser extent, employers are forsaking the fee-for-service economic model and using evidence-based guidelines to affect consumption.
"There are more and more individuals who are feeling this price pressure, which means the individual has much more skin in the game," says Thompson. Couple that with cost pressures on government and the employer, "and with the cost of care approaching 18%–20% of GDP, that puts pressure on government and employers to the point where it becomes unsustainable."
Thompson says the merger with Dean—a network of clinics and medical facilities that provide primary, specialty, and tertiary care throughout southern Wisconsin—will work to lower costs because "consolidation and economies of scale allow me to control my internal cost because I have negotiating leverage with my vendors and can apply that to lowering my cost structure."
Thompson, who says he is excited to bring many aspects of Dean's model into SSM, says he doesn't expect the market for M&A to subside for a while. He sees consolidation accelerating as standalone hospital boards become more aware of their inability to compete, and, like Cosgrove, predicts that several big systems will end up dominating the provider landscape.
Meanwhile, the hospital industry continues to experience a degree of churn. "I'm always puzzled by the lack of equilibrium. You have Tenet acquiring Vanguard. Later we'll see them spin off assets in some markets, [and] those will be acquired by someone else who's striving to get larger in a particular market," he says. "They'll all still be trading assets even if you have the 'Big 12,' so to speak."
Monopoly concerns misplaced?
There is disagreement about whether the consolidation ultimately will lead to monopoly power within a few systems and thus no bending of the cost curve. Cosgrove, for one, discounts those concerns.
"When people ask me about that, I point out that right now 50% of our hospital bill is being paid for by the government, and what we get paid is fixed. You get roughly the same amount for gallbladder surgery, for example, in Boston, New York, and San Francisco," he says. "Everyone in Washington and the insurance industry says we'll get to 75% of the hospital bill being paid by the federal government. If that's the case, it will be hard to have a monopoly when you have prices that you don't have control over. Of that remaining 25%, some will be no-pay and some will have private insurance."
So will government as payer have the monopoly power, as is the case in many nations with single-payer healthcare?
"I haven't really thought about it like that, but I think that's exactly right," Cosgrove says.
CMS has its own projections about payer mix in the near to medium–term. CMS expects the total government share of healthcare spending (local, state, and federal) will reach nearly 50% by 2021, up from 46% in 2011.
Still, even health system CEOs in relatively stable markets and who are not looking to grow through acquisition are not so sure monopoly is not on the minds of at least some players orchestrating merger activity in healthcare. After all, many hospital operators are for-profit companies, and allegiance to shareholders comes first.
And there has been an explosion of private equity operators in healthcare as these groups have acquired struggling hospitals and systems in an effort to turn around their finances and reap the benefits of consolidation. (See related story, page 14.) Even such nonprofit stalwarts as Cleveland Clinic and Duke University Health System have entered into affiliation agreements with for-profits, exemplified by Cleveland Clinic's "strategic alliance" with Community Health Systems and Duke's joint venture with LifePoint Hospitals, called Duke LifePoint Healthcare.
Bill Atkinson, president and CEO of WakeMed Health & Hospitals, an 1,100-licensed-bed nonprofit health system in Raleigh, N.C., says the insurance industry can serve as a cautionary tale for those who expect consolidation to reduce overall healthcare costs for the government, employers, and individuals.
"If you look at the insurance industry, there is stability in size," he says. "But the real snapshot is looking at insurance consolidation and asking if insurance costs went down. The answer is no, so what does that tell you? Where the money is going is changed, but it has ended up in the hands of the companies and has not generally trickled down to the people it should be about—the consumers."
"We'll all lose if consolidation is just an opportunity to squeeze out more margin," he continues. "You have to start with the assumption that the system needs to meet the needs of the patients in the community. This is not first and foremost in some organizations."
He says WakeMed, which reported 2012 total operating revenue of nearly $1.1 billion, with total margin of 8.10%, is content to focus on its local area, and if another system is looking to acquire it, it may have to wait a while.
"What it means is we're not always looking for the next economic angle," he says, and performing its mission of improving health in the local community "doesn't have to be about ownership."
He cites as an example Harnett Health System, a two-hospital system in nearby Harnett County that WakeMed manages and which just opened a new 50-licensed-bed hospital with help from WakeMed's A1 bond rating.
"We've not had to own it to make it a healthy system," he says. "We built that hospital with them. They wouldn't have had access to the loans to build it in our absence, but at the same time they didn't need us to own them to make that happen."
Still, Atkinson says the way his system operates isn't for everyone, and concedes that following "the economic angle" can produce value in healthcare as it has in other industries.
"There are plenty of organizations that have reduced cost and at the same time have produced value. Look no further than Amazon," Atkinson says. "The question is whether healthcare organizations will effectively use the resources they have to increase value overall. All of us have demonstrated time and time again in micro attempts that that can be done."
No longer hospital-centered
As Cleveland Clinic and others have demonstrated, integration and achieving economies of scale and scope are not dependent on ownership. In truth, the fact that headlines in healthcare are focused on hospital ownership is a bit of a relic. Inpatient care is no longer a growth area, given the focus on population health and treating patients in lower-cost settings engineered by both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and commercial and employer emphasis on preventive care.
Many local hospitals—typically dominated by community-based directors and focused on provincial interests—often lack the capability to expand their offerings much beyond the inpatient care space. Over time, that could lead them to seek affiliations or acquisitions with systems that can build out that outpatient capability, among other business imperatives like investment in IT and care pathways.
But just because some hospitals and small health systems are realizing they don't have the firepower to make that transition, getting to that point is often frustratingly slow, Cosgrove admits. That sluggish pace presents an obstacle to Cleveland Clinic becoming one of the Big 12 that Cosgrove envisions will eventually dominate healthcare.
"A lot of communities and boards have difficulty giving up that control and responsibility for their community hospital. That has been a real process. Every time we've done it it's taken as much as two years to get from the point of them insisting on being independent," Cosgrove says.
At the same time, the process is getting easier, he says.
"It has accelerated because people are feeling the financial pressure, and as reimbursement goes down, they'll feel that increasingly."
He contends that inpatient bed count has to go down one way or another.
"There are 200,000 fewer beds than there were because of shorter hospitals stays and because more is being done in an outpatient setting," he says. "As hospitals have empty beds and decreased reimbursement, they're incented to be part of a system."
Cleveland Clinic has put together an impressive array of care sites that Cosgrove says "is built on the principle of doing the right thing for the right person in the right location."
It's got partnerships not only with Franklin, Tenn.–based Community Health Systems but also with national drugstore chain and pharmacy benefit manager CVS/Caremark, and has developed its own family health centers for chronic care. Cleveland Clinic's community hospitals perform common procedures such as deliveries, orthopedics, and general surgery but increasingly don't do complex procedures such as heart care or neurosurgery. Those cases are fed to the clinic's main campus.
"We've connected all of that to our EMR and transportation system," he says. "So we move people around and their records follow them."
This process will become more ingrained over time as Cleveland Clinic becomes increasingly integrated and more of a system.
"Our model of care is something that's appropriate for the 21st century—particularly because we're an employed-physician group, so we don't have incentives to do more operations and tests," Cosgrove says.
Acquiring struggling hospitals does not have to be part of the equation for whether a hospital or health system ultimately is able to remain independent, says WakeMed's Atkinson. Consolidation will continue, he says, and that's neither good nor bad, "but a rural hospital with a tough population base to cover is the same thing the next morning after you buy it."
Perhaps that money earmarked for growth through acquisition would be better spent improving ways to manage patient health, which is part of what Cleveland Clinic and others are doing, although they are also acquiring formerly independent hospitals.
"We're doing that pretty assertively," says Atkinson. "We were the first in the area to create freestanding EDs."
WakeMed has four of those, with a fifth planned, and Atkinson says they can treat everything except level I trauma or imminent birth, and claims that about 90% of what's presented in those EDs can be handled without a bed.
"What I'm saying is you can get out on a limb and find new ways to get care closer to people and probably improve the clinical outcome and significantly reduce cost. Those EDs allowed us to stop building as many beds as we had been. Our biggest campuses are ambulatory and don't have inpatient beds and may never have them."
Reaping the rewards of population health
Cleveland Clinic's relationship with CHS—which owns, operates, or leases more than 135 hospitals and reported 2012 net operating revenues of $13 billion—originated about a year ago when CHS leaders asked Cleveland Clinic to help CHS with its quality, says Cosgrove. Though Cosgrove doesn't describe the partnership this way, it could be considered a virtual merger in that both organizations are seeking to leverage each other's perceived competitive strengths—Cleveland Clinic on quality and CHS on operations.
Cleveland Clinic puts a priority on publicizing its treatment outcomes on its website, and has spun off a company, Explorys, that now has 40 million patient test histories, physicals, and lab results in an effort to offer reporting, analytics, clinical integration, at-risk population management, and pay-for-performance solutions for its clients.
"The more we talked, the more they realized there were things we could do for them, but we realized they could do a lot for us," Cosgrove says. "While we've concentrated on quality, they've really concentrated on efficiency. If you're looking at value for your healthcare dollar, those two things are what you have to focus on. So we each brought different strengths to the relationship. The relationship came about because both leadership teams believe effective population health management will increasingly be a differentiator for patients and the payers for healthcare services.
"Our ability to access big data will be a tremendous advantage for us," Cosgrove says, "and we think there are economies to be had without necessarily owning the other or merging."
Another step many organizations are already busily taking is the idea of expanding services outside the outpatient arena—even to the payer side in bigger systems—says Dennis Vonderfecht, president and CEO of the 13-hospital Mountain States Health Alliance, based in Johnson City, Tenn. Its health plan, CrestPoint Health, has 15,000 members, but significant expansion is on the horizon.
"You're seeing volume declines across the country, and part of it is due to the ACOs and focus on keeping people out of high-cost settings. We're seeing the same declines in our organization," he says. Vonderfecht expects to lose as much as 30% in inpatient volumes over the long term if recent trends hold true.
"If we lose 30%, that's a lot of our revenue, so we're working on backfilling that by moving to the top of the healthcare food chain to capture part of the savings through creative initiatives with other insurance companies," he says. "But we can capture all of it if we're the insurer. Also, to lessen the impact of volume declines, we're focusing on outpatient ambulatory and retail activity. For example, we now own seven pharmacies."
Burgeoning health systems won't be the only source of competition, however.
"You'll find the major disruptor will be in primary care," Cosgrove says, adding that drugstore chains like Walgreens, CVS, and even Walmart are emerging to fill gaps in primary care.
"They're getting more sophisticated and with the shortage of primary care physicians, they'll take up more primary care—we hope, linked with providers."
Size and success
Vonderfecht says no one has all the answers, but at every conference he attends, "the size you will need to be successful keeps growing. You can only take so much cost out, and larger systems have an advantage there."
He believes very large regional systems like his, which operates in four contiguous states, will be most successful.
For his part, SSM's Thompson couldn't agree more, and he worries about the same things leaders worry about with any combination—that the promise of better efficiencies and lower healthcare costs will never be realized. "There will be organizations executing on this and at the end of the day they will not have derived any benefit from it," he says.
He also questions how big his organization needs to be, and whether there is such a thing as being too big.
"We're on the same bigger-is-better bandwagon as everyone else, but can I derive the same or better significant economies of scale as a $15 billion [revenue] organization as I can as a $5 billion one? The jury's out that everyone can achieve the cost savings they're targeting."
And Thompson has advice for anyone else on this road:
"You have to fully understand what you're trying to achieve when you go into these deals, make a detailed integration plan, and work with an organization that understands there will be equal disruption to achieve the benefits we believe are there through the transaction. The worst outcome will be if you don't change following these deals."
Reprint HLR1013-2
This article appears in the October issue of HealthLeaders magazine.
Bumping up nurse staffing levels by three nurse hours per patient day provides a demonstrable and marked reduction in hospital readmissions. But the financial implications of doing so are tricky.
Changing the business model in healthcare from payment for outcomes rather than for volume of services rendered is critical to reducing costs and improving quality in healthcare. But so far, the financial incentives for re-engineering the business model are not significant enough to force a rapid transition.
Still, we may be heading in the right direction—for instance, in nurse staffing.
Nurse staffing levels are always a critical point of contention between staff and management. CEOs rightly keep a close eye on labor costs, and nurses are among the most expensive of hospital labor. States, labor unions, and others have attempted to tell CEOs how they should manage nurse staffing ratios, and in many circumstances, they have succeeded in establishing minimum levels.
But how much is enough?
Nurse staffing ratios have been studied backwards and forwards to determine their impact on patient care, but a recent study in Health Affairs has finally linked nurse staffing levels to outcomes. According to lead researcher Matthew McHugh, PhD, JD, MPH, RN, hospitals with higher nurse-to-patient staffing ratios have lower odds for being penalized for excessive readmissions in CMS's Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, which is estimated to reduce hospital payments by roughly $280 million in 2013.
Those are big numbers, but to extrapolate the financial and quality impacts of adding to nurse staffing for the roughly 5,000 hospitals around the country is impossible. Still, McHugh and his colleagues came close.
The research team was innovative in its approach. It attempted to eliminate almost any other variable in its calculations by "twinning" similar hospitals among the 2,826 hospitals studied based on nurse staffing ratios and data on readmissions penalties. In other words, researchers compared hospitals that were alike in every possible way other than nurse staffing ratios.
Here's what they found:
Hospitals with higher nurse staffing had 25% lower odds of being penalized than similar hospitals with lower nurse staffing ratios.
Hospitals with higher nurse staffing levels have 41% lower odds of receiving the maximum penalty for readmissions, compared with hospitals with lower staffing.
Each additional nurse hour per patient day is associated with 10% lower odds of receiving penalties under HRRP, the researchers estimate.
McHugh says he and his fellow researchers were trying to overcome methodological, as well as political issues that have clouded nurse staffing studies in the past.
"When you think of nurse staffing studies, you can't take a lot of the results as seriously as you might otherwise because they're comparing apples to oranges," McHugh says. "We were able to take a measure of nurse staffing based on hours-per-patient-day and create matched pairs across the country. Each hospital had basically a twin, as similar as possible in all manner and respect except for nurse staffing."
The researchers made sure the hospitals were matched in terms of low-income patients, case mix, and teaching status. Doing so eliminated as many other variables as possible that could affect readmissions other than nurse staffing. It also allowed them to compare and isolate the effect of a much higher level of nurse staffing.
Still, left to CEOs and other upper management team members is what action to take from what the study reveals. The highest performing hospitals differed with the lowest performing ones by about three hours of nursing time per patient per day, "which is a lot," concedes McHugh, who adds, "we didn't go into calculating the financial trade-off."
That raises another difficult point: the financial implications.
Currently, the highest penalty for readmissions according to CMS policy is a 1% reduction in DRG payment. Somehow I doubt whether avoiding some of those 1% by adding three hours per patient day is going to pay off immediately.
Other payers may have penalties as well, but most readmission penalties apply to Medicare patients only. But if you focus only on the numbers, you'll miss all the other benefits of increasing nurse staffing, McHugh maintains. Further, the CMS penalty will rise to 2% for fiscal year 2014, and other penalties that may be affected by nurse staffing ratios appear likely as well, McHugh asserts, in future years.
"So right now, this won't pay for itself entirely, but the good thing about focusing within is that the benefits of higher nurse staffing levels aren't isolated to particular patients, but apply to all of them," he says. "Besides, penalty percentages are going up and the number of conditions that are covered [by readmissions penalties] are being added."
Still, based on this study and in general, there's no magic number on nurse staffing levels, McHugh says. And there are ways to make more of your nurse staffing or get more out of it without necessarily adding headcount or unit labor costs. For instance, says McHugh, improving the education level of your nursing staff, or by requiring higher educational standards, "you get more bang for your buck."
CEOs are cognizant of staffing levels and are paying close attention to it on a financial side, but in relation to outcomes, maybe not so much, McHugh says
But clearly, nurse staffing has a connection with the quality care, patient satisfaction, and outcomes. And if hospitals and health systems are going to make the transition from volume to value, those metrics are crucially important.
A bill in Congress, (HR 1821), among other requirements, calls for staffing levels to be posted on Hospital Compare. The bill has been referred to committee and who knows if it will ultimately pass? But if it does, "that will not be comfortable for some hospitals," McHugh says, "but it would be helpful for both nurses and the public."
If you're a highly qualified, capable nurse, where would you want to work?
Unless you take steps to equip them to do so, physicians will continue to be unprepared to lead changes in clinical guidelines critical to performing under healthcare reform.
A huge amount of change is in process within the American healthcare system, and physicians will play a huge part in whether or not healthcare costs will moderate and quality will improve. Trouble is, in most cases, they're unprepared to play a leading part. That's because the large majority have no leadership training.
Team-based care, which is at the foundation of reimbursement based on added value, is foreign to many of them, says David Nash, MD, MBA. He is dean of the Jefferson School of Population Health, based at Philadelphia's Thomas Jefferson University.
I'm not revealing anything revolutionary here, but Nash says that's not necessarily their fault, because physicians are trained to lead themselves, not others. "Imagine a football team of docs," he says. "They don't know each other's names, they don't practice together and they all want to play quarterback when they play on Sunday and they want to play well. That's where we are in physician leadership."
Underlying the attempts to push for and deliver value on the insurance/employer/patient side and the provider/physician side, respectively, is a belief that physicians will work together with other physicians as well as their colleagues in nursing, case management, and with medical technicians, among others, to deliver efficient, coordinated care to patients.
"We want doctors to be the leader of the team, but we don't teach them how," Nash says.
The physician is supposed to be the leader of this teamwork approach to delivering healthcare. But financial incentives alone won't necessarily deliver the expected outcome, says Nash. Physicians have to be trained to operate this way, because it's the opposite of how most were trained in school and in residency.
"Some people consider physician leadership an oxymoron," says Nash. "That's sad and totally not fair, but I've actually had doctors say to me there's no such thing [as physician leadership]."
Yet physician leadership as a concept or area of scholarly inquiry has received a lot of attention in the past decade. The school Nash leads in Philadelphia is ample proof of that in itself. But Nash says Jefferson's School of Population Health is far from sufficient to achieve the lasting change and value in healthcare that nearly all players in this game profess to want to achieve.
If value and higher quality are really the goals, Nash says, hospitals and health systems must take the lead on providing that training to their physicians. That's easier said than done; this training is expensive.
It often takes doctors away from their practice for periods of time, many doctors who need this training most are not employees of the hospitals and health systems where they practice, and many leaders and board members worry that an investment in physician leadership training may train doctors only to have them compete with the health system.
Yet the evidence that physicians need this training is ample.
"The average board certified internist has had seven years of post-college training," says Nash. "In that seven years, she may have had only two hours of classroom-based leadership training. And we expect these people to lead the development of the patient-centered medical home?"
Of course, there's a problem in painting an entire diverse group of 600,000 practicing physicians across the country as deficient in leadership skills. Physician leadership is not an oxymoron. Many of the most well-known proponents of evidence-based medicine, infection and quality control, clinical integration, and many other groundbreaking innovations in patient care are physicians.
They're heading up ACO programs. They're chief medical officers. They are leaders in promoting and developing clinical informatics. More and more hospitals and health systems are tapping physicians as their CEOs. So they are out there. There just aren't enough of them, says Nash.
You simply can't practice population health without physician leadership and physician integration.
The American College of Physician Executives has been training physician leaders for 30 years. Members of that organization, including Nash, self-identify as spending more than 50% of their work time in a leadership role.
"But we only have 11,000 members," says Nash. "So you're talking about 2% or less of practicing physicians who are in a leadership role. For success under reform, we need 10-15% of physicians in that role."
There's also been an explosion of graduate training programs exclusively designed for docs that are exclusively online. But funding and time is a huge issue. Organizations, and more particularly their boards, need to take charge, Nash argues.
"Funding physicians to go to ACPE and various master's programs is a great start, and is one strategy, Nash says. "Another one is to bring ACPE faculty to their institution.That's the on-site program. Third, you can grow your own physician leadership program, and there are several outstanding ones."
Nash mentions physician leadership programs at Texas Children's Hospital, Ochsner Health System in New Orleans, UnityPoint Health in Des Moines as examples.
"At those, docs fight to be included," he says.
But those organizations commit significant institutional resources for physician leadership training, making their creation a board-level decision.
"Hospital CEOs don't want to do this," says Nash. "Boards have to do it. I counsel them that it's their fiduciary responsibility to demand the commitment of resources to physician leadership training."
Nash says CEOs are understandably reluctant to pay to train leaders from the physician ranks when they reason that the physicians may at some point use that training to compete against the hospital or health system.
"I don't subscribe to that worldview, but I understand its appeal," Nash says. "But I could make a strong economic argument to the cost of free training if you believe health reform means we're headed to bigger systems that are risk-bearing, integrated across sectors, boast seamless coordination, and that there are leadership challenges to implement the new measures coming our way."
He says healthcare will require a small army or leadership-trained physicians to run the core components of health reform from ambulatory quality to patient-centered medical homes. After all, your hospital or health system's PQRS [Physician Quality Reporting System] score is going to be online in 2015, so the hospital error rate will be researchable, he says.
Traditional top-down leadership is ill-suited to the changes required for accountable healthcare. Empowerment, also known as bottom-up leadership from frontline workers, may be the best route to organizational transformation.
Founding father Thomas Paine is widely but wrongly credited with saying, "Lead, follow, or get out of the way," to his fellow revolutionaries.
Yet despite the misattribution, the saying has staying power because it's a useful rallying cry for those who prefer action to endless deliberation and debate. It even has something to tell us about the transformation healthcare leaders are charged with engendering at their organizations these days, as they try to make a dramatic business shift from a volume-based model to a value-based one.
But in a touch of irony, CEOs might be better served not as the leaders or the followers in that maxim, but as those who get out of the way. As a leader of your hospital or health system—and for many of you, as the leader—you're used to providing the vision and asking your lieutenants to execute that vision. That's traditional top-down leadership, and there's nothing inherently wrong with it. But it's not the only way to lead, and in many instances, it's far from the best way. That's not just my opinion; more and more of you are telling me that in a new era of accountable healthcare, the CEO can't always say—to borrow from President Truman, who actually did say this—"The buck stops here."
In recent conversations with healthcare leaders, I'm hearing a word that nicely describes this leadership philosophy: empowerment. In this sense, empowerment is 180 degrees away from the top-down model, but it's still leadership. In fact, you might call it bottom-up leadership.
What these leaders mean when they talk about empowerment is that they're enabling others to lead, and they're getting out of their way. When I talk to CEOs about such things as removing waste from processes, they almost always reference their use of Lean, which relies on frontline workers to identify wasteful steps in providing care and which also relies on them to design better, more efficient processes. This is just one example of empowerment, or getting out of the way.
There are many ways to lead, but bottom-up leadership is counterintuitive because many don't consider it leadership at all. On the contrary, it takes a special leader to know that he or she doesn't have all the answers, and that those on the front lines of care—whether they're nurses or business analysts or registrars—might be best equipped to get your health system focused on driving out inefficiency.
It's amazing sometimes what it takes to see decisions get made in healthcare, which is one reason why so many agree that healthcare is so far behind other industries. In general, healthcare is so afraid to be bold—to make mistakes—that it defaults to the "way we've always done it."
That's not going to cut it in an era in which being nimble and taking risks will be rewarded, and where the overall revenue pie is shrinking. That isn't to say some big mistakes can't cost you your job, but inaction will do the same thing.
You know you don't have all the answers, and neither do your subordinates, but they know about their world, and they're more likely to have the right answer in those narrow areas than you are. Make them accountable for their decision, but let them make the call. That's the only way you'll be able, overall, to make the transformational process change that will prepare your organization for a much different business model.
Do some introspection. Maybe it's time to have to have a private conversation with yourself and realize the only way this is going to work is if you let your people try something and be okay with making mistakes here and there. If you can get to that point, you're well on your way to something other than leading or following—you'll be leading by getting out of the way.
Being measured is nothing new for top healthcare leaders, but for many, renewed board focus on the future means that leaders are being measured based on an increasingly complex conglomeration of performance targets.
Measures and metrics are starting to better define healthcare success, and that's a good thing. It's all part of being more accountable about costs and waste in an industry that's infamous for both. But that measurement isn't just for reforming wasteful processes or measuring patient compliance or satisfaction anymore: Now it's right in the middle of the C-suite.
That means more of your compensation is at risk, or as is said, 'dependent' on these measures. Where it gets interesting is the kinds of new measures that are being introduced by active boards around the country that determine more and more of compensation.
Being measured is nothing new for top leadership, but what they're being measured on is changing rapidly, according to Andrew Chastain, managing director of the southeast region and vice chairman of the board at Witt/Kieffer, a well-known healthcare executive search and consulting firm.
Those who would like to see healthcare emulate other industries in terms of rigor around performance targets are getting their wish.
"It used to be that incentive compensation was around the financials and it defined quality as patient satisfaction," he says. "Now it's literal outcomes."
As he and I spoke, Chastain reviewed actual executive compensation plans from a variety of his clients. Many of them are determining executive bonus compensation based on Surgical Care Improvement Project (SCIP) measures, whether the organization exceeded norms on evidence-based medicine follow-through, and other complex measures of quality.
"Right now, I'm looking at two or three pages of really complicated stuff about quality," he says. "It's the right stuff, the quality committees of these boards are getting with the compensation committees on a systematic approach to what they're going after on the quality side. This is much more granular than before. It's not just core measures and patient satisfaction."
Chastain says that around 40% of a health system CEO's, overall compensation can now be tied to these measures, which should be quite enough to align incentives and force executives to do some of the most difficult work in their health systems—improving quality, removing waste, and improving integration.
Breaking down that potential bonus, executives who achieve goals in areas such as their net operating income, patient satisfaction score, a strategic component or two, and safety and quality can receive the full bonus.
Chastain says the most difficult to measure historically, quality and safety, when they were part of the bonus structure in the past at all, were often difficult to measure, and depended on fairly simple metrics. Not anymore.
"It's getting easier to measure [quality and safety] because it's being defined for them by their payers," he says. "They can argue with docs about what quality really is, but they're being measured by these metrics."
Chastain says that looking at the past three years of measures pertaining to one client provides an illuminating view of how compensation is changing, and bonus compensation is getting more complex as boards start to implement long-term bonuses based on as much as three years' rolling average of the metrics that are being measured.
"So in this example, for years 2013-2016, the board is saying 'we want you to accomplish these things: Establishing a medical group, rolling out an IT plan'—these are multiyear things. There are other buckets of dollars associated with those three-year arcs," he says. "And next year, they will establish goals for another three-year arc."
The idea is that the three-year arcs create an incentive for the CEO and his or her team to stay in place, Chastain says.
Leadership stability is a good thing in an industry that's undergoing such massive changes that require hospitals and health systems to basically redo their business model. Instead of being measured on volume, boards are starting to measure their leaders on value creation. Sound familiar?
"This way of evaluating senior leaders allows boards to set long term goals so that if they execute them, they'll have a lot of dollars they don't want to leave [by moving on to a new job]," says Chastain.
With consolidation increasing, he says boards are becoming more and more savvy about evaluating their leadership. They don't just defer to the executive's judgment and perceived expertise anymore.
Chastain relates a story about a health system with about $3 billion in net annual revenue that engaged him in an executive search. The chair of the finance committee, who serves on several other boards, told him there's not a lot of difference in terms of board focus between the health system board and the ones he serves on in other industries.
"I used to be on a hospital board," says Chastain. "Historically, the discussions were around which surgeon was upset about his or her block time," he says. "Now they are having discussions around quality, and whether to buy, sell, build, or merge. This is corporate board stuff."